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I. INTRODUCTION
A. General Perspectives
In 1906, sixteen-year-old Francesco Conte and his two brothers,
Nicolo and Giuseppi, trekked down from the hills of Grottaminarda with
their donkey, cart, and bags to traverse the eighty miles to Naples. From
there, the brothers boarded a ship that would take them thousands of
miles away from their parents, sister, and three older brothers and
toward a new life in America. The land of la famiglia Conte could not
sustain the three boys, and there was no other work available. They had
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. The author would like to thank
Dean Lisa Kloppenberg for her support and encouragement in the development of this Article and
express his heartfelt appreciation for the advice and encouragement of his good friend and
colleague, Professor Ramzi Nasser, who recently passed away far too soon.
1. In determining that the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, of the U.S.
Constitution, prohibited the State of New York from passing legislation to protect its farmers and
merchants from competition with out-of-state milk importers, Justice Benjamin Cardozo reasoned
that to accept the state's argument as to the constitutionality of the legislation "would be to invite
a speedy end to our national solidarity" and that the Constitution was framed "upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511, 523 (1935).
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no family in America, spoke no English, and had no formal education or
skills other than what they had obtained working on the small family
farm. But it was well-known that America was a land of great opportu-
nity, and the brothers promised that they would send clothing, shoes,
and whatever else they could to their family and friends back home.
Francesco lived a long life, but he would never again see his par-
ents or the siblings he had left behind. After a few years working as a
gardener, he would meet Bridget O'Brien. Bridget was a cook
employed on the same estate as Francesco, and she had recently immi-
grated to New Jersey from County Meath, Ireland, in an effort to better
her life. The two would fall in love, marry, and raise a large family
together. Francesco would become a stone mason, a builder, and later
help make jet engines for warplanes. Their family carried on through
personal hardships, triumphs, tragedies, and war, and eventually gener-
ated many more families, each deeply embedded in American life.
More recently, Ahmed Nasir, a French national and a Muslim, trav-
eled from the outskirts of Lyon, France, to Leeds, England,2 to live with
his cousin in the U.K. Ahmed hoped to learn English, find work, sup-
port his family in southern France, and eventually bring his impover-
ished parents and siblings to England to join him. During his first six
months in the U.K., Ahmed sought work but was only able to find the
occasional odd job. Members of the Muslim community of Leeds sup-
ported Ahmed, but his English skills developed slowly. When he even-
tually sought accommodation in a government-supported residence, he
was told that without steady employment and medical insurance, U.K.
immigration authorities would send him back to France. Six months
later, Ahmed was officially notified that he could no longer remain in
the U.K. and that he had to leave within two weeks.
Francesco and Ahmed's contrasting stories raise fundamental ques-
tions about the relationship between sovereignty and immigration.
When people emigrate in search of a better life, should it matter that
they are not citizens of the State or nation to which they are moving?
Likewise, should it matter whether the place to which they are moving is
connected to or united with the place from which they have come? Is
2. Leeds is in West Yorkshire in the north of England and is home to many British Muslims;
the Beeston area of Leeds was home to two of the four Muslim men who carried out suicide bomb
attacks killing 56 persons on three London subway trains and a bus on the morning of July 7,
2005. As a consequence of this and other terrorist attacks, fear, mistrust, and deep suspicion of
cultural and religious differences are creating a fast-growing "virtual wall" between the 20 million
Muslims living in Britain and Europe and non-Muslim Europeans. See London Bombers 'Were
All British,' BBC NEWS, July 12, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk-news/4676577.stm; Jim
Maceda, Learning Religious Tolerance in Luton, NBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2006, http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/I 1767006; The Bombers, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/
uk/05/londonblasts/investigation/html/bombers.stm (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
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the security and integrity of one's own community enhanced when it is
bounded and separated from the strange and external? Do strong bor-
ders enhance the freedom to move, grow, and pursue happiness for those
who reside within those borders? Do they preserve a community's cul-
ture and values and thereby allow a community to truly be a
community?
These questions, in turn, lead to others about community identity.
How great or small or politically autonomous must a community be to
preserve its values, culture, and freedom? Should the boundaries of a
culturally secure community be coterminous with those of a nation, or
even a province or a state? If so, to what extent should a nation, prov-
ince, or state restrict the admission of economic migrants in the name of
preserving its unique identity? Or should the goal be to create expansive
communities, perhaps spanning continents or even the world, which are
more welcoming to foreigners, but possibly less secure?
Today,3 international legal norms assume that the free but bounded
community is manifested in the nation-state. Drawing upon its sover-
eign power, the nation-state can protect its freedom and culture. This
power, however, can have the opposite effect on outsiders - it can
destroy their freedom and culture. Under most nations' laws and in the
minds of most of their people, it matters a great deal when those who
intend to reside in a particular land are neither citizens nor invited to
reside there. Indeed, in most cases, a sovereign State can lawfully pre-
vent non-citizens from entering its borders.4 Today it is unlikely that an
individual facing dire economic circumstances like Francesco Conte
could emigrate from Italy to the United States. In fact, as Ahmed
Nasir's story illustrates, a European Union citizen might encounter more
3. In earlier times, of course, European settlers moving to North America did not consider
the need for citizenship or an invitation from North America's existing societies, as the Western
European concepts of sovereignty and citizenship were unknown to the native North Americans.
In international law terms, one might argue that, at the time, North America was wholly or largely
"terra nullius," the land of no one and no state, and that few if any societies in North America
were sovereign in international legal terms, and hence the territory was open to discovery,
occupation, and settlement. Still, the long-time native inhabitants had societies - cultures, values,
freedom, and physical well-being, if not traditional political systems - before they were destroyed
during the European conquest and settlement. Whether those European claims in the "new world"
could be successfully asserted today is doubtful. According to the International Court of Justice,
"territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having social and political organization [are] not
regarded as terra nullius," and thus are not subject to occupation and acquisition by so-called
discoverers. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, IT 79-80 (Oct. 16).
Ironically, the new American society and the old European societies now rely upon concepts such
as sovereignty, citizenship, and the essentialness of their cultures, values, and freedoms to protect
them from "outsiders," a protection not accorded the territories and societies they conquered.
4. See, e.g., Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892); see also Chae Chan
Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889).
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difficulty migrating within the European Union than Francesco encoun-
tered migrating between sovereign States lacking such a union.
But are we better off in today's world? When people come from
outside the community and are able to find a place to live and work,
should a free society not welcome them as fully as citizens? Are we less
rich or less complete without the Francescos and Ahmeds? Or are we
simply more secure?
This Article is not intended to answer fully these questions; rather, I
hope to suggest the free movement concerns that should stimulate more
extensive discussion of policies on free movement and residence. In
particular, this Article aims to compare the United States' freedom of
movement principles, as set forth in the United States' Constitution and
jurisprudence, with those of the European Union.
Within a sovereign federal State such as the United States, it is
relatively easy for citizens of any state or political subdivision to travel,
work, or reside in any other state or political subdivision. Nonetheless,
even American citizens have occasionally encountered obstacles when
seeking to migrate between constituent states. These obstacles have typ-
ically affected families and individuals needing social and economic
assistance, children whose non-citizen parents entered the country with-
out proper documents, university students, and persons temporarily
engaged in less than essential activities such as recreational hunting or
fishing.
In a treaty-based federal system, like the European Union, where
the system's foundational purpose is economic integration, work-based
travel and work-based migration from State to State is also substantially
free from restrictions. Moreover, Member State citizens are deemed
European Union citizens, which allows them to reside in, and travel
between, other Member States with relative freedom. As Ahmed's story
illustrates, however, there are some exceptions, limitations, and condi-
tions to free movement within the European Union. There are also
obstacles to free movement stemming from cultural and national identity
as well as obstacles that relate to sovereignty and national citizenship,
none of which are formally embedded in the European Union's laws and
treaties.
While European Union freedom of movement principles have tradi-
tionally been predicated on economic integration, there is a contempo-
rary movement to expand beyond a purely economic rationale. As this
Article will discuss, the European Court of Justice's ("ECJ") decision in
Baumbast v. Secretary of State for the Home Department typifies this
[Vol. 61:331
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movement.5 But, is the European Union, and more specifically the ECJ,
the proper body to espouse an expanded notion of freedom of movement
amongst Member States? Should the ECJ narrowly construe legal
restrictions on free movement and, as it seems to be doing, encourage
eliminating those restrictions, thereby offering truly free movement to
all within the Union?
Some might seek this very result - enhancement and advancement
of absolute integration and free movement within the European Union.
One could argue that any limitation on free movement within the Euro-
pean Union impedes the Union's efficacy - one cannot create a unified
economic community when capital, including labor, cannot freely move
within that supposedly unified community. There are social and cul-
tural, as well as economic advantages of free movement. In addition to
enabling individuals to better their lives, ensuring free movement for all
European Union citizens has the potential to lead to a stronger, more
thoroughly integrated and less discriminatory European Union. This
view supports permitting phrases such as "sovereign State" and
"national citizen" to evolve, becoming more limited as the federal sys-
tem advances. Independence and sovereignty could arguably still be
assured so long as Member States in the federal system had merely dele-
gated modest portions of their powers over internal matters to the federal
system and could withdraw from the treaty system at any time.6
On the other hand, others might argue that more traditional notions
of Member State sovereignty and national citizenship should prevail to
ensure greater security, the preservation of national and cultural identity,
and economic and social stability. While the European Union's eco-
nomic efficacy depends on a broad interpretation of free movement prin-
ciples - implying less national control over who enters and resides in
each Member State and who benefits from each Member State's social
assistance - how much of this control can Member States relinquish and
yet remain sovereign? Are the essentials of a State's integral sover-
5. Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091. The
ECJ's decisions are available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlexlex/SuiteJurisprudence.do?TI=Vll l&
T3=V 1 &RechType=RECH-jurisprudence&Submit=search.
6. The current European Community treaties do not provide for Member State withdrawal
from the European Union. However, voluntary withdrawal would be permitted under Article 1-60
of the proposed, but as of yet unratified European Constitutional Treaty. Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe art. 1-60, 2004 O.J. (C310) 40. For the time being, a Member State
desiring to withdraw from the European Union would need to invoke Article 54 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, whereby all contracting parties (all other Member States)
would have to agree on the terms replacing the current framework after a complex set of
negotiations. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
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eignty, independence, and destiny not degraded, even completely evis-
cerated, when the State is unable to limit immigration?
In light of these concerns, perhaps the ECJ's broad interpretation of
free movement and European Union citizenship principles infringes on
the Member States' retained sovereignty. The Member States may need
more discretion in deciding who can reside within their borders. Per-
haps this broad discretion includes the right to determine whether non-
nationals threaten State security and the right to condition entry on the
individual immigrant's ability to contribute to the State's economic and
social vitality. Moreover, is it not possible that greater control fairly
exercised by sovereign Member States would actually improve Europe-
ans' confidence in their European Union institutions and enhance their
European consciousness?
Limitations on free movement may also be rational and important
in a system of independent States where each State maintains its own
distinct national interests and cultural identities. Assuming this is the
more sensible position, the ECJ and the relevant Member State courts
and authorities should approach free movement issues in a manner that
assures Member State citizens and political leaders that their economic
well-being and national identity are secure. The idea is that if properly
conceived and employed, these free movement limitations will sustain
the citizens' confidence that they control their own destinies, a confi-
dence that may free them to engage more readily in the European
enterprise.
This Article's aim is two-fold. First, to properly consider the
above-mentioned issues, the Article analyzes both the European Union
and the United States' free movement principles and their relationship to
national citizenship and sovereignty. Second, the Article offers a brief
critique and a proposed direction for the development of free movement
and residence principles in the European Union and the United States.
B. Experience in the European Union and the United States
1. EUROPEAN UNION
When participating in the 2005 referendums to ratify the European
Union's proposed Constitution, French and Dutch citizens were likely
motivated in part by serious concerns about mass immigration. Specifi-
cally, the French fear was often represented by the example of an
unwarranted influx of "Polish plumbers" to France,7 and the Dutch
7. See JLULIANNA TRASER, REPORT ON THE FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS IN THE EU-25:
WHO's AFRAID OF EU ENLARGEMENT 18 (Tony Venables ed., 2005); see also infra note 9.
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feared increased Muslim immigration to the Netherlands.8 Both France9
and the Netherlands' ° voted against ratification. Better empirical data
regarding the reasons that voters rejected the European Union's Consti-
tutional Treaty may be forthcoming, but it seems clear that many were
concerned that the newly expanded," and potentially expanding,"2 Euro-
pean Union would contribute to economic hardship and unemployment
13
8. The Netherlands, known in recent times as a very open society, now has approximately 1
million Muslim immigrants amongst a population of just over 16.25 million people. A. Hanscom,
Allah's Socialists, FrontPageMagazine.com, Sept. 20, 2006; Muslims in Europe: Country Guide,
BBC NEWS, Dec. 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm. The November 2,
2004 brutal assassination of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, whose short film Submission challenged
fundamentalist Muslims' treatment of women, sharply heightened Dutch citizens' concerns
regarding the prospect of more Muslim immigration. Van Gogh, the great, great grandnephew of
the artist Vincent Van Gogh, was murdered in the street by Mohammed Bouyeri, a radicalized
Dutch-born Muslim of Moroccan descent. See Theodore Dalyrymple, Why Theo Van Gogh Was
Murdered, Crri JOURNAL, Nov. 11, 2004, http://www.city-journal.org/printable.php?id=1719;
Van Gogh Killer Jailed for Life, BBC NEWS, July 26, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
4716909.stm.
9. The French rejected the European Union's Constitutional Treaty with 54.8% voting
against the measure. EUROPA, A Constitution for Europe, Ratification and Referendum State of
Play, http://europa.eu/constitution/referendumen.htm. The result of the vote was largely
attributed to high unemployment in France and the perception that Polish and other Eastern
European labor (the "Polish Plumber" stereotype) would further exacerbate the employment
situation. This perception is reflected in a recent European Union survey entitled The Future of
Europe in which seventy-two percent of the French surveyed claimed that further Union
enlargement "would increase problems on their country's job market." Commission White Paper
on the Future of Europe, Special Eurobarometer 251, at 4, 56-58 (May 2006), https://www.
eurobarometer-conference.eu/pdf/future/ReportEBCommFutureofEuropeEN20060428_v7.pdf.
Ironically, according to the French plumbing union, there is actually a shortage of 6,000 plumbers
in France and a mere 150 Polish plumbers currently working in France. See Elaine Sciolino &
Helen Fouquet, Unlikely Hero in Europe's Spat: The Beckoning 'Polish Plumber,' N.Y. TIMES,
June 26, 2005, § 1, at 1.
10. The Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty with 61.7% opposed. Immigration,
particularly Muslim immigration (who already make up about six-percent of the population), has
been a volatile issue, as reflected by the reaction to the fmurder of Theo Van Gogh. Economic
concerns, as reflected in restrictive Dutch policies toward Eastern European - especially Polish -
workers, may also have contributed to an "anti-expansionist" sentiment during the Dutch
ratification vote. See Traser, supra note 7, at 17-18; Van Gogh Killer Jailed for Life, supra note 8.
11. On May 1, 2004, under a Treaty of Accession signed at Athens on April 16, 2003, the
European Union expanded to include Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. This was in addition to the Union's
fifteen existing Member States (France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy,
the United Kingdom, Ireland, Demark, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Greece, Portugal, and Spain).
Treaty of Accession to the European Union, April 16, 2003, 46 O.J. (L 236) (Sept. 23, 2003)
[hereinafter Treaty of Accession].
12. Bulgaria and Romania became members in 2007; and Turkey, a Muslim nation, remains
in line for European Union membership.
13. Germany and France had in excess of ten-percent unemployment in 2005. See Traser,
supra note 7, at 18. Nonetheless, this perception is surprising given that less than 1.5% of workers
in pre-enlargement Member States are from other Member States. Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Report on the Functioning of the Transitional
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and would undermine the Member States' cultural and national
identities.
While Member States have traditionally been quite homogeneous,
and largely non-Muslim, present-day France and the Netherlands have
substantial Muslim immigrant populations (approximately 5.5 million
and 1 million respectively). 4 Recent European Union terrorism inci-
dents, the war in Iraq, and the Muslim world's stunning reaction to the
Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed are likely to signifi-
cantly reinforce concerns over a potential loss of cultural and national
identity vis-A-vis Muslim populations. Most of the Muslims residing in
Member States, however, did not come from other Member States, but
rather from North Africa, South Asia, and Turkey. 15 Thus, concerns
about substantial Muslim migration from Member State to Member
State is not entirely rational. Naturally, this would change if and when
Turkey is admitted to the European Union.
Immediate fears of unemployment are also exaggerated. Even as
the Union expands to include ten new Member States and, now in 2007,
also Bulgaria and Romania, the Transitional Arrangements under the
2003 Accession Treaty permit Member States to take national measures
to regulate and limit access to their labor markets for workers from most
new States until April 30, 2011. 6 France and the Netherlands have each
taken advantage of the availability of restrictions during the transition
period. '7 Despite the anxiety concerning an influx of foreign workers,
however, less than two-percent of the average Member State's working
population comes from other Member States.' 8 Furthermore, in every
country other than Ireland and Austria, the percentage coming from new
Arrangements Set Out in the 2003 Accession Treaty, at 3-11 COM (2006) 48 final (Aug. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter Communication from the Commission to the Council].
14. Muslims in Europe Country Guide, supra note 8.
15. European Muslims: Basic Information, http://www.Islamonline.net/English/European
Muslims/basicinfo/index.shtml.
16. Treaty of Accession, supra note 11, art. 3. See also Communication from the Commission
to the Council, supra note 13, at 3-11.
17. Communication from the Commission to the Council, supra note 13, at 4. Between 2003
and 2005, less than one-tenth of one-percent of France and the Netherlands' working age
population was comprised of nationals from the ten new enlargement states, and virtually no new
work permits were issued to these nationals in France in 2004. Id. at 9. By contrast, in Ireland,
which, like Sweden and the U.K, did not restrict labor flows from Eastern Europe, migrants from
the new enlargement states comprised about two percent of the working age population in 2005
and were employed at a rate of eighty-five percent, the highest in Europe. Id. at 9-11. States like
Ireland with larger migrant flows reported that increased migration was a welcome benefit to their
national economies. Statistics also suggest that migration flows have had positive effects on the
original European Union Member States. Id. at 14.
18. Id. at 9. See also P.R.S.F. MATHUSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 194 (8th ed.
Sweet & Maxwell 2004).
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Member States is considerably lower."
The economic and national identity concerns are not restricted to
the working class. Some professionals and academics share similar sen-
timents. In a recent conversation about these issues, a German academic
and business person explained to the author that while Polish workers
and professionals are energetic and work well with non-Poles, Turkish
workers in Germany keep to themselves, persist in their traditional cus-
toms, do not mix well, and do not learn German or adapt to German
culture.2" This individual attributed these characteristics to the Turks'
different culture and religion, despite the fact that Turkish workers have
been in Germany for many years.2 ' One academic commentator, dis-
cussing the resistance to free movement within the Member States,
relates a conversation with a senior manager at a major Spanish univer-
sity who "smilingly" told him that "his university had Spanish jobs for
Spaniards only."22 A German lawyer from former West Germany, who
was working on European Union-related matters in the former East Ger-
many, was "troubled" because, in her view, East German workers had
unrealistically high expectations for pay and social benefits, were not
integrating well even within Germany, and were less productive than
West Germans. 3
While these examples are anecdotal, they do represent the views of
educated professionals familiar with the European Union's broad pur-
poses. Nonetheless, these individuals harbor feelings that European free
movement taints their cultural heritage, national identity, and national
employment environment. Since the enlargement of the European
Union from fifteen to twenty-five Member States, only the United King-
dom, Ireland, and Sweden have been receptive to workers from the new
Eastern European Member States.24 Approximately 450,000 Polish
19. Id.
20. Interview with anonymous German academic and businessperson in Dayton, Ohio (Mar.
27, 2005).
21. See e.g., Kemal Kirisci, Immigration and Asylum Issues in EU-Turkish Relations:
Assessing EU's Impact on Turkish Policy and Practice, in MIGRATION AND THE ExTERNALrIES OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 125 (Sandra Lavenex & Emek M. Uqarer eds., Lexington Books 2002);
William Hale and Gamze Avci, Turkey and the European Union: The Long Road to Membership,
in TURKEY IN WORLD POLmCS: AN EMERGING MULTIREGIONAL POWER 31, 36 (Barry Rubin &
Kemal Kirisci eds., Lynne Rienner Publishers 2001). See also Rachel Elbaum, Integration
Questions Stir Passions in Germany, MSNBC NEWS, May 25, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/12935103/.
22. See Mark Jeffery, The Free Movement of Persons Within the European Union: Moving
from Employment Rights to Fundamental Rights?, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 211, 231 (2002).
23. Interview with anonymous German attorney in Trier, Germany (June 23, 2005).
24. Communication from the Commission to the Council, supra note 13, at 9-11. See David
Rennie, EU Urged to Give British Welcome to Polish Plumbers, TELEGRAPH, July 9, 2005, http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/09/07/weuO7.xml (noting that "an influx
of 100,000 Poles [into the U.K.] has only fuelled growth").
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workers, by far the largest new Member State group, have been much
less successful seeking work in other Member States. 5 Significant
examples of resistance to Polish, Latvian, and other eastern European
workers have been reported in France, Italy, and Spain.26
As will be discussed throughout this Article, European Union insti-
tutions, particularly the ECJ,21 actively seek to facilitate the free move-
ment of persons to work and live in other Member States, and they have
created a generous legal framework to support this goal. In contrast,
Member State regulations often undermine this objective by creating
residency time limits and requiring non-nationals to document their
identity and obtain residency permits. These administrative hurdles
represent only a fraction of the actual challenges free movement faces in
the European Union. Migrants also face economic obstacles, linguistic
and cultural challenges, and the xenophobic attitudes of many Member
State citizens who are often intent on guarding their national identity and
culture. Ironically, these hurdles may in some ways be the result of the
European Union and the ECJ's lack of concern for Member State sover-
eignty and national citizenship. Either way, European Union citizens
who attempt to migrate often encounter more difficulty than one might
expect from simply reading the European Union institutions'
pronouncements. 8
2. UNITED STATES
Historically, persons moving from one state to another within the
United States have not always encountered warm welcomes. In fact, the
supposed application of mobility and citizenship principles in the United
States has often produced less than noble results. African-Americans
fleeing slavery were captured and returned to southern states under the
auspices of state law,29 the laws and Constitution of the federal govern-
25. See Traser, supra note 7, at 17-19.
26. Id. at 18, 21.
27. See infra, Part III, Section A. The ECJ, along with the Court of First Instance, is
generally responsible for ensuring "that in the interpretation and application of [The Treaty
Establishing the European Community] the law is observed." Treaty Establishing the European
Community (Nice consolidated version) art. 220, Dec. 24, 2002 O.J. (C235) 295 [hereinafter EC
Treaty]. While the court does not have broad appellate and discretionary responsibilities like the
United States Supreme Court, it does function much like the Supreme Court in terms of its power
to interpret law for national courts, invalidate the actions and laws of national governments, and
provide interpretative guidance to the Member States and the European Union's institutions. For a
more extensive description, see Mathijsen, supra note 18, at 106-142; PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE
BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALs 86-90, 96-102 (Oxford University Press 3d ed.
2003).
28. See Mathijsen, supra note 18, at 193-194; see also N.W. Barber, Citizenship, Nationalism
and the European Union, 27 EUR. L. Rav. 241 (2002).
29. For example, in 1847, the General Assembly of the State of Missouri passed a law
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ment,3° and the United States Supreme Court's decisional law. 31 During
World War II, the federal government expelled United States citizens of
Japanese ancestry from their homes and sent them to detention camps.32
States have also erected barriers to out-of-state indigent persons 33 and
others requesting social services.34 From the 1860s and 1870s onward,
American citizens from northern states supporting southern Reconstruc-
tion were characterized as "carpetbaggers." These so-called carpetbag-
gers and civil rights workers, both black and white, frequently faced
expulsion and violence in southern states.35
I recall as a young lawyer, a judge and local landlord in Massachu-
setts who referred to my client, a local resident, as "one of these
'darkies' come up here from the Carolinas and thereabouts just to get
better welfare payments and other benefits. Even then," he continued,
"they seldom make the rent payments on time, if they make them at
all." 36 That same summer while representing an indigent person, a dif-
ferent judge in another Massachusetts county asked me, a member of the
state bar, for my credentials and questioned why I thought I could prac-
tice law before him in "his county." These attitudes and obstacles, while
usually based on race, gender, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, or disa-
bility, and not on state residence, persist today among some Americans
and continue as obstacles to the freedom to work, to seek education, and
to live as a citizen of equal self-worth.
Today, state and cultural identity rarely prevents Americans from
moving to or engaging in economic activities in other states. Indeed,
banning the immigration of free African-Americans into Missouri. http://www.sos.mo.gov/
archives/education/aahi/earlyslavelaws/An%20Act%20Respecting%20Slaves,%201847.pdf ("No
free negro or mulatto shall, under any pretext, emigrate to this State, from any other State or
territory.").
30. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. (the Fugitive Slave Clause), repealed by U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII. See also Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 462 (1850); Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,
ch. 7, 2 Stat. 302 (1793).
31. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 411-13 (1857) (holding that a free African-
American, whose ancestors were brought to the United States and sold as slaves, was not a
"citizen" within the meaning of the United States Constitution).
32. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-220 (1944).
33. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 171 (1941).
34. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 623 (1969) (a Connecticut statute
prohibited individuals who had not resided in the state for a year from receiving aid), overruled in
part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
35. See RoY MORRIS JR., FRAUD OF THE CENTURY 37-45 (Simon & Schuster 2004).
36. This occurred in Fitchburg, Massachusetts, in the summer of 1971 during an in camera
discussion regarding a plea arrangement between the judge, the prosecutor, and the author, a legal
services lawyer. My two clients, one of whose parents had emigrated from the Cape Verde
Islands to Massachusetts, had been leaders of a demonstration in favor of funding a community
action center. In large part due to police tactics, my clients' demonstration became violent. They
were charged with several counts of disorderly conduct and assault and battery.
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Americans' interstate mobility is remarkable compared to what it was a
mere generation ago. Personally, I have lived and worked in five states
and the District of Columbia and worked and resided temporarily in
three additional states without having to satisfy any general administra-
tive or substantive requirements. Other than in-state and out-of-state
university tuition differences and separate professional fitness and char-
acter investigations,37 American citizens are generally free to work and
move readily from state to state. While in the European Union, less than
1.5 percent of the average Member State's workers are citizens of other
Member States,38 many more United States citizens travel to work in
one state while residing in another. Americans are free to obtain the
benefits of state residency and are accepted not as New Yorkers,
Virginians, or Texans,39 but as Americans.
II. ANIMATING PURPOSES OF INTERSTATE MIGRATION PRINCIPLES IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
A. European Union
In addition to horrific destruction of life and property, World War
II produced desperate economic conditions. I recall the drab and
depressing cinema news of German and other European displaced per-
sons moving silently across scorched earth with vacant stares and little
hope. To me, a six- or seven-year-old at the time, being European was
synonymous with hunger and despair.
Shortly after World War II, European leaders4 ° and thinkers4'
37. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 442 (1973) (students challenging higher tuition for
out-of-state students); see also Starns v. Malkeson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affid
without opinion, Starns v. Malkerson, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
38. CIA, The World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ee.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
39. This is not to say that Americans are indistinguishable on the basis of colloquial accents
and dialects. Quite the contrary, regional differences and stereotypes abound.
40. In 1946, Winston Churchill proposed a "closer political union" amongst European nations
and called for the construction of a "United States of Europe." GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4 (West 1993). In 1949, a Treaty established
the Council of Europe. Id. In the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, French Foreign Minister
Robert Schuman described actions that European States could take to move towards European
unity, a first step being the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"). The
Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, available at http://www.robert-schuman.org/gb/robert-
schuman/declaration2an.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Schuman Declaration].
Signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, the ECSC placed
coal and steel production under a High Authority and promoted free trade within these sectors.
Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community arts. 4, 8, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140.
41. Jean Monnet was a great proponent of European integration; he provided the inspirational
philosophy behind European integration and was the first President of the ECSC's High
Authority. Italians Spinelli and Rossi developed the Ventotene Manifesto "Calling for a Federal
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began to turn away from the extreme nationalism that had wrought dev-
astation and war and began to consider political structures that would
promote peace and harmony, such as a federal European State.42 In a
passionate drive for future peace in Europe and economic improvement
through economic integration, European States adopted a number of
treaties and conventions throughout the late 1940s and 1950s to foster
both economic integration43 and human rights." The Schuman Declara-
tion affirmed: "World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making
of constructive efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it."4 5
This drive for peace and economic integration was the purpose ani-
mating the first steps towards a European political union. The earliest
efforts to unify culminated in the European Economic Community,
which came into effect in France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg,
and the Netherlands in 1958.46 Since then, the Union has grown to
include 27 Member States and currently functions under the consoli-
dated Treaty of the European Union ("TEU")4 7 and the Treaty Establish-
ing the European Community ("EC Treaty").48 Remarkably, with time
and growth, Europe has transformed from a fragmented continent of dis-
placed persons to the well-integrated European economic market that it
is today. In light of this historical context, the genuine search for a
European consciousness in political and social affairs we see today is a
phenomenal achievement.49
Unlike the United States Constitution,5° the EC Treaty is quite
explicit in protecting, encouraging, and facilitating the free movement of
Europe." See PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1-6
(LexisNexis 2003); see also ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR & RICHARD F. SCOTT, THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION: A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 10-32 (Carolina Academic Press 2001).
42. Stephan, supra note 41, at 1-6.
43. In addition to the ECSE and the EC Treaty, the European Atomic Energy Community
Treaty established "a common market for specialised materials and equipment, by free movement
of capital for nuclear investment." Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community
art. 2, Apr. 17, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. This treaty was followed by the Single European Act,
Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L169) 1, and the Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J.
(C191) 1 [hereinafter TEU], each of which advanced a common European market.
44. In 1950, the Council of Europe drafted and signed the remarkable European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Convention established a
European Commission, which has now been eliminated, and the European Court of Human
Rights, both of which have been instrumental in protecting and entrenching rights and freedoms in
Europe and even fostering the constitutionalization of such rights in some Member States. See
Bermann, supra note 40, at 4.
45. Schuman Declaration, supra note 40.
46. Bermann, supra note 40, at 6-7.
47. TEU, supra note 43.
48. EC Treaty, supra note 27.
49. See generally Stephan, supra note 41.
50. See e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498-504 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 630-631 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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persons in the European Union. In a chapter entitled "Workers," Article
39.1 of the Treaty states that, "[f]reedom of movement for workers shall
be secured within the Community."'" Article 39 goes on to state that
"such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimina-
tion based on nationality between workers of the Member States as
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and
employment."52
Moreover, the opening provision of the EC Treaty entitled "Princi-
ples," states that the Community's tasks include
establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union
... to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced
and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of
employment and of social protection ... a high degree of competi-
tiveness and convergence of economic performance . . . and eco-
nomic and social cohesion and solidarity among the Member
States.5 3
These provisions emphasize the union between Member States and their
goal of creating a single European economic market. Furthermore, Arti-
cle 39 of the EC Treaty characterizes "the free movement of workers" as
an essential element of the means to achieving economic union 4.5
European Union institutions, particularly the Council of Minis-
ters,55 have further recognized that it is critical for European workers to
possess free movement. Accordingly, the Council has enacted legisla-
tion that supports the workers' right to travel with their families.56 In
the Baumbast case, the ECJ first identified
the importance for the worker, from a human point of view, of having
his entire family with him, and secondly, the importance from all
points of view, of the integration of the worker and his family into the
host Member State without any difference in treatment in relation to
nationals of that State.
57
The goal of completing and supporting the European Community's
internal market profoundly animates free movement's meaning. Aspira-
51. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 39.1.
52. Id. art. 39.2.
53. Id. art. 2.
54. Id. art. 39.
55. The Council of Ministers functions as the primary legislature for the European Union
(although more recently, it is has been viewed as virtually co-equal in many legislative matters
with the European Parliament). The Council of Ministers is made up of ministers from each of the
Member States. Id. art. 202-210; see also Mathijsen, supra note 18, at 73-89; Craig & De Burca,
supra note 27, at 65-71.
56. Council Regulation 1612/68, Freedom of Movement for Workers in the Community, art.
12, 1968 O.J. (L 257).
57. Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091,
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tions for a truly unified internal market began with the Single European
Act of 1986 ("1986 Act") and in Article 14.2 of the EC Treaty. 5' Article
14.2 states, "[t]he internal market shall comprise an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty."59 It
includes each Member State's territory and recognizes no boundaries
between the Member States for internal market purposes. The 1986 Act
and the EC Treaty also granted European Union institutions the ability
to enact legislation facilitating the internal market by qualified majority
voting, rather than by the more difficult unanimous voting required by
the European Council. 6° As one European academic put it, "the core
principle is that there should be no barriers to free movement - except
under the narrow application of permitted exceptions - interpreted by
the ECJ.'61
As will be discussed later, the ECJ has been active and generous in
interpreting and applying free movement principles. It has extended
residency rights, benefits, and education to workers' spouses, former
spouses, and children, even after the worker has ceased working. The
ECJ has mandated that Member States provide a wide range of social
benefits to non-national workers, trainees, part-time workers, and work-
ers' children and spouses. This mandate has somewhat countered cir-
cumstances that formerly discouraged families from moving with their
worker relatives to other Member States. The ECJ has also indicated
"that the same principles underpin all of the Treaty provisions on free-
dom of movement, ' '62 whether the matter involves free movement of
goods or workers, 63 the right of establishment, 64 or the freedom to pro-
65vide services.
In addition to laws and doctrines that abolish obstacles to European
58. Single European Act art. 1, Feb. 17, 1986 O.J. (L169) 4; EC Treaty, supra note 27, art.
14.2.
59. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 14.2 (emphasis supplied).
60. Single European Act art. 1, Feb. 17, 1986 O.J. (L169) 5; EC Treaty, supra 27, art. 14.3.
61. Patricia Conlan, Address, Fundamental Principle of the Internal Market (Trier, Germany,
Jun. 23, 2005) (copy on file with the Academy of European Law).
62. Craig & De Burca, supra note 27, at 784.
63. See Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165.
64. The right of establishment is one of the four freedoms established by the EC Treaty, supra
note 27, arts. 43-48. The right of establishment pertains to persons who pursue businesses or
subsidiaries, whether trades, professions, or businesses, in another Member State. The right of
establishment, as with worker free movement principles, allows a person to freely reside in a
Member State in which the person establishes a business.
65. EC Treaty, supra note 27, arts. 49-55. The freedom to provide services relates to persons
from a Member State providing commercial, industrial, professional, or craftsman services,
temporarily or sporadically, in other Member States.
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workers' free movement, Member States have added the complementary
concept of European Union citizenship.
In 1993, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union made every
Member State national a European Union citizen.66 By adding Article
18 to the EC Treaty, every Union citizen was given "the right to move
and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. '67  This
grant of European citizenship extended European free movement rights
to non-economic actors. By virtue of Article 12 of the EC Treaty, Mem-
ber States are also prohibited from discriminating against Union citizens
based on nationality. For example, discrimination against workers, their
spouses, and their children is prohibited under the free movement of
workers provisions.68
Free movement principles, including non-discrimination, removal
of obstacles to free movement, and the liberalizing trends facilitated by
the ECJ's jurisprudence 69 have been concomitantly extended in a non-
economic context to European Union citizens. At first blush, this sug-
gests that a collective European political and social identity, represented
by Union citizenship and a heightened European "consciousness" that
embraces a "newly absolute right" to free movement and residence,7 ° is
the overarching purpose in the area of European interstate migration.
There are, however, limitations on that expansive notion. The Peo-
ple's Europe Program, endorsed by the European Council in 1985 and a
precursor to the adoption of the treaty-based European citizenship, is
subject to the limitation that persons who move to new Member States
must have sufficient resources to avoid burdening the Member States'
social assistance systems. This is a more significant limitation and more
limited right to movement and residence than state citizens in the United
State face.7 1 The European Council asserted that it was "adopting mea-
sures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its
66. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 17.
67. Id. art. 18.
68. See Case C-85/86, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2691; see also Case
C-224/98, D'Hoop v. Office National de l'Emploi, 2002 E.C.R. 1-6191; Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk
v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignies-Louvainla-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. 1-6193.
69. Indeed, in Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. I-
7091, 82, the ECJ stated that "[u]nion citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of
nationals of the Member States."
70. GEORGE BERMANN ET AL., 2004 SUPPLEMENT TO CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 162 (2004).
71. See Council Directive 90/364, 1993 O.J. (L 317) 59 (discussing residence fights for
students; readopted under EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 12, after the ECJ found the provision was
invalidly adopted under Article 308 of the EC Treaty); Council Directive 90/365, 1990 O.J. (L
180) 28 (discussing residence rights for retired or disabled former workers); Council Directive 90/
364, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26 (discussing residence fights for other non-workers, including retired
persons, self-employed, and students).
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citizens and for the rest of the world. 72 In 1993, following this effort to
create a "European Consciousness," the Member States adopted Euro-
pean citizenship via the Maastricht Treaty. Thus, European citizenship
adopted some of the People's Europe Program's goals. Indeed, a rous-
ing purpose of the People's Europe Program and the European citizen-
ship treaty provisions is to eliminate all barriers to European Union
citizens' free movement rights, thereby creating a Europe without inter-
nal boundaries.
The accompanying limitations of European citizenship, though,
belie this idea of "creating absolute free movement" within the European
Union. Under the Union Citizenship provision, European Union citizen-
ship complements but does not replace national citizenship.73 As such,
the EC Treaty recognizes the superior standing of national citizenship
and subjects "the right to move and reside freely" to "the limitations and
conditions laid down in [the EC] Treaty and by the measures adopted to
give it effect."'74 These characteristics sharply contrast with the free-
doms of residence and movement of national citizens within a sovereign
federal State like the U.S.
In addition, in interpreting the EC Treaty's Article 18.1 on the right
to free movement for European Union citizens, the ECJ determined that
"students who are nationals of a different Member State and who wish to
exercise the right of residency" must satisfy national authorities that they
"have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social
assistance system of the host Member State during the period of resi-
dence... and that they be covered by sickness insurance in respect of all
risks in the host Member State." This would extend to restrictions upon
other non-worker European citizens who seek Member State resi-
dency.75 Although the ECJ construes residency restrictions in this
respect narrowly, 76 older European Union citizens, retired Union citi-
zens with little retirement income, Union citizens lacking health insur-
ance, and young, unemployed Union citizens may constitute "a burden"
on a Member State's social assistance resources. Consequently, these
parties may lack the freedom to move to and reside in a host Member
State despite their acknowledged Union citizenship.
72. See Bermann, supra note 40, at 630-31.
73. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 17.1.
74. Id. art. 18.1.
75. Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignies-Louvainla-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. I-
6193, In 37-38; see Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R.
1-7091, 81, 87; see also Council Directive 90/364, 1990 O.J. (L 180) (conditioning right of
residence of non-economic actions on the possession of health insurance and sufficient resources
to avoid burdening the state).
76. In Baumbast, the ECJ stated that any restrictions would have to be "necessary and
appropriate to attain the objective pursued." 2001 E.C.R. 1-7091, 91.
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Furthermore, the term "host" Member State - the language often
used in European Union texts - and references to "the period of resi-
dence" further weaken Union citizens' residency rights. This linguistic
differentiation may belie the Baumbast court's contention that European
Union citizenship is destined to be the Member State national's funda-
mental status.77 In other words, it may belie that court's vision that
European citizens will eventually view themselves in much the same
fashion as American citizens - Americans first and state citizens second.
In addition, under European Union law, other Member States'
nationals may be required to produce a valid identity card or passport
and must obtain a Residence Permit for the host Member State.78 And,
as will be discussed below, under the EC Treaty, Article 39.3, workers
and those who derive free movement rights from workers are subject to
Member State limitations on public policy, public security, or public
health grounds. The ECJ has narrowed these principles to restrictions
that are necessary to achieve the exception's legitimate objective. Addi-
tionally, the ECJ often applies these exceptions only when the individ-
ual's personal conduct falls within the restriction.79
Due to the Member States' sovereign and independent character,
one might expect that Member States would have extensive power to
exclude non-nationals on national security or economic grounds. One
might further expect Member States to have power to preserve their cul-
tural identity as long as it was this legitimate public objective that was
being served, particularly concerning the free movement of non-workers
and their families. To date, however, the ECJ has chosen to carefully
circumscribe the Member States' discretion in these contexts. Nonethe-
less, when restrictions under these exceptions are carefully tailored,
would-be host Member States can use them to restrict inter-Member
State migration.
Article 39.4 of the EC Treaty poses further free movement limita-
tions for European Union workers - through that provision, Members
States are entitled to deny or restrict employment in the public service
sector.80 What constitutes public service employment, however, is not
left solely to Member State discretion; rather, the ECJ generally inter-
prets the term narrowly. The ECJ limits the public service restriction's
application to activities involving "the exercise of powers confined by
public law to responsibility for safeguarding the general interests of the
77. Id. 1 82.
78. Council Regulation 68/360, 1968 O.J. (L 257) 13, arts. 1-4; see also Council Regulation
1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L 257) 2.
79. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 39.3; Council Regulation 64/221, 1964 O.J. (L 56) 850.
80. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 39.4.
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State" or to positions involving participation "in official authority."'"
Though narrowly construed, these limitations restrict free movement in
ways commonly associated with non-nationals in other societies. For
example, the United States' federal government may restrict non-citi-
zens from public service employment.
In the contexts described above, European Union citizens are not
host Member State citizens. Full Member State citizenship is limited to
Member State nationals. Article 17 of the EC Treaty, which establishes
Union citizenship, reinforces this notion by stating that Union citizen-
ship "shall complement and not replace national citizenship."82 While
appearing generous and robust, ECJ decisions regarding the free move-
ment rights bound up with Union citizenship are often opaque and
unclear.83 Those decisions seem to leave open the possibility that Mem-
ber States may create more carefully constructed limitations, conditions,
and exceptions to free movement rights.
Together, national administrative requirements, Article 18.1's "lim-
itations and conditions" clause, public health exceptions, public policy
exceptions, security exceptions, the public service limitation, and
national citizenship's superior status within each Member State's bor-
ders represent something less, perhaps much less, than an absolute right
to European free movement. While those who advocate the European
ideal strive toward a goal of "One Europe, One People" and a pervasive
European consciousness, including the abolition of all barriers to free
movement and residence, the EC Treaty's provisions and the Union's
directives provide something less. This leaves the European Union's
"economic integration and internal market" as European free move-
ment's primary animating purpose. Advancing European "conscious-
ness" is, at best, a secondary interest underlying European free
movement principles.84
B. United States
One of the Federal Republic's foundational principles is "[t]he peo-
ple of these United States constitute one nation [and that] [t]hey have a
government in which all of them are deeply interested, '8 5 that "the con-
81. Case 149/79, Comm'n v. Belgium, 1980 E.C.R. 3881, T 7.
82. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 17.1.
83. See Jeffery, supra note 22, at 222.
84. This may be an ungenerous and troublesome characterization for the original proponents
of a unified Europe and many of the European Union's current supporters. It would be improper,
however, if the aspirations of many individuals, including current European Union leaders and
judges, would trump the free movement and citizenship concepts agreed to in the EC and TEU
treaties.
85. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 43 (1867). Or as Justice Cardozo eloquently explained,
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stitutional right to travel from one State to another... occupies a posi-
tion fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union, 86 and that "[f]or
all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we
are one people, with one common country [and] are all citizens of the
United States, and, as members of the same community must have the
right to pass and repass through every part of it"87 or "to reside in any
other state."88 American citizens' allegiance and service to the sover-
eign Federal State, and the sovereign people of the United States, are
lynchpin elements of the unified federal state concept. Gibbons v.
Ogden89 identifies further elements of the federal sovereign's overarch-
ing role. Therein, Chief Justice John Marshall observed that while the
states, prior to ratifying the Constitution, may have been "sovereign, ...
completely independent, and .. .connected with each other only by a
league. . . , when [they] converted their league into a government,"
under the federal Constitution, "the whole character in which the States
appear, underwent a change."9 And, in construing the federal power
over "commerce ...among the several States," Marshall determined
that such power would have to comprehend "every species of commer-
cial intercourse"'" that became "intermingled with,"92 or introduced
into, the interior of the states as long as it "extend[s] to or affect[s] other
States."93 Justice Marshall found that the federal commerce power is
complete and plenary within its domain and is "vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government."94
While Justice Marshall may not have chosen these words, the fed-
eral commerce power's underlying principles - just like Americans'
"[tihe Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in
range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim
together. ... Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
86. United States. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966). Justice Stewart provided an
explanation for why the Framers chose not to explicitly mention this right in Constitution: it is "a
right so elementary [that it] was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of
the stronger Union the Constitution created." Id. at 758.
87. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 492 (1849) (statement of Chief Justice Taney, which
was relied upon in Guest, Crandall, and Shapiro, amongst others).
88. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
89. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Some of the Framers disagreed with the notion that the
states were ever independent and sovereign. Elbridge Gerry, a member of the Federal Convention
from Massachusetts and a member of Congress at the time the Articles of Confederation were
formed, "urged that we were never independent States . . . even on the principle of the
Confederation" and that "[t]he States [and] the advocates for them were intoxicated with the idea
of their sovereignty." James Madison, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, June 29,
1787, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/debates/629.htm.
90. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187.
91. Id. at 193.
92. Id. at 194.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 197.
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freedom to travel, work, and live - are bound up with the Federal
Union's sovereignty95 and the American people's sovereignty-based fed-
eral citizenship.96 The most formidable expression of this combination
of federal sovereignty and citizenship may be the federal government's
virtually exclusive power over foreign affairs through the Executive97
and Congress.98 This power is also reflected in the federal government's
control over American immigration99 as "an inherent attribute of sover-
eignty."'" Federal citizenship's advantages contrasted with non-citi-
zenship's disabilities - particularly within the context of political
participation, social benefits, and employment - demonstrate this
power's importance. t 0 These American citizenship characteristics illus-
trate the significant difference between sovereignty-based federal citi-
95. In a federal republic like the United States, this "sovereignty" is a combination of self-
government by the people, the sovereign people, referred to by Justice White in Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982), and the sovereign nature of the independent union of states
represented by the federal government, whereby the people and their government together rule
and exercise freedom within their nation, define the character of the national community, and
shape its external relations.
96. This contrasts sharply with the non-sovereign character of the federal system of the
European Union as opposed to the "true" sovereignty of its Member States, the not quite whole,
though useful, nature of European citizenship, and the fuller national (Member State) citizenship
that it complements.
97. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Louis
HENKIN, FoREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrTUTION (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1996).
98. This would be exercised through Congress's power over foreign commerce and implied
powers derived from the spending power, the power to declare war, the necessity of the Senate's
consent to Treaties, and the like. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434
(1979); United States v. Guy W. Copps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953), aft'd, 348 U.S.
296 (1955).
99. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (proclaiming the plenary
power of the federal government to exclude foreigners); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893) (extending this plenary power to the power to deport non-citizens).
100. See The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, II U.S. 116, 136 (1812) (Chief Justice Marshall
stated that "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and
absolute"); see also Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711.
101. Over the years, we have seen that Congress has exercised virtually plenary power over
non-citizens by placing conditions on their right to remain in the country. See, e.g., Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2000 & Supp. 2004) (section of U.S. federal immigration
law describing conduct that will subject lawfully residing non-citizens to deportation); Demore v.
Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). States also discriminate against non-citizens on
the basis of alienage, particularly where alienage implicates "the political function" of the state.
See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (upholding limitation of probation officer
positions to American citizens); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a citizenship
requirement for the state's public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978)
(upholding a requirement that state troopers be citizens). Where state positions or other jobs go to
the heart of our democratic, political community or involve the making or exercise of public
policy, states may discriminate against non-citizens; otherwise, the states would need to
demonstrate a compelling state interest before limiting employment in an area to American
citizens. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646-47 (1973) (holding that the discharge
of aliens - amounting to a flat ban on aliens in civil service public employment - not limited to
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zenship in the United States and treaty-based federal citizenship within
the European Union. American citizens represent in fact what was
aspirational for the ECJ in Baumbast - American citizenship, as
opposed to state citizenship, is the average American's fundamental
status. '
02
Whereas economic integration is the primary and animating free
movement purpose in the European context, 10 3 it is an important, but not
primary, purpose in the American context. State laws providing debtor
relief, creating proprietary paper money, establishing the inability of
out-of-state creditors to protect their rights in state courts, and redistrib-
uting property protected by another state's laws all exemplified the
period under the Articles of Confederation. Shay's Rebellion, during
which farmers in western Massachusetts rose up in arms with the intent
to march on Washington, D.C., further emphasized the need for a more
unified sovereignty. The lack of federal control, Congress's inability to
prevent economic discrimination against the citizens of other states, and
restrictions on commerce by one state against the citizens of another
state or foreign State, eventually led the way to the Philadelphia Con-
vention in 1787, which produced the United States Constitution. Thus,
the Confederation government's inability to fund itself and to create
effective and non-discriminatory rules regarding interstate and foreign
commerce were among the significant reasons for creating the new fed-
eral structure, which, in turn, altered the basic nature of the relationship
among the federal government, the states, and the American people. 1 4
Thirty-five years after the Constitution's ratification, the United
States Supreme Court emphasized federal power's critical nature in reg-
ulating interstate relationships. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Mar-
shall held that "[t]he [federal] power over commerce is complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limi-
tations."' 10 5 Much later, in addressing state efforts to regulate commerce
in ways that burden or discriminate against interstate commerce, Justice
Jackson elaborated upon the commerce power's significance:
This distinction between the power of the State to shelter its people
from menaces to their health or safety and from fraud ... and its lack
of power to retard, burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for
those areas justifying the use of the political function exception, violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
102. Cf Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091.
103. See infra discussion accompanying notes 38-58.
104. See ROBERT RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON: THE FOUNDING FATHER 13-17 (Macmillan Pub.
Co. 1987); Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution,
75 IOWA L. REv. 891, 893-94 (1990).
105. 22 U.S. 1, 196 (1824).
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their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted in both our history
and our law.'
0 6
Justice Jackson continued by observing that "[t]he principle that our
economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers neces-
sary to control of the economy"'' 7 and that "[o]ur system, fostered by
the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be
encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every market in the Nation."'0 8
For citizens engaged in every sort of work, the nation would be
truly unified. Moreover, the new Constitution purported to protect citi-
zens from an ever broader area of disabilities or discrimination, largely
under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1, which reads, "[t]he Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privilege and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.""1 9 This clause, also known as the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, was meant as "a necessary concomitant of the
stronger Union the Constitution created."' 0° As was explicitly stated in
the Articles of Confederation, "the people of each State shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State.""'
Early decisions identified the Privileges and Immunities Clause as
the source for Americans' residency rights and the rights to work or
transact business in any other state.' 12 One might surmise that pure eco-
nomics engendered both the foundational principle of "one nation, one
people" and the Supreme Court's early interpretations of the Privileges
106. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949).
107. Id. at 537 (emphasis supplied).
108. Id. at 539.
109. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
110. United States. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
111. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1777). See also 3 MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 112 (rev. ed. 1937), in which Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina states, "[t]he 4th article, respecting the extending [of] the rights of the Citizens of each
State, throughout the United States ... is formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of
the present Confederation." The article eventually adopted did not include the "free ingress and
regress" language, despite the fact that Article IV of the Articles of Confederation included both a
Privileges and Immunities Clause and a "Free Ingress and Regress" Clause. This suggests that
the Article IV of the Constitution and Article IV of the Articles of Confederation do not embrace
the same rights. The latter Article IV, in pertinent part, reads:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these
States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of
each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively . . ..
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1777).
112. See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
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and Immunities Clause. Little was said at the time; perhaps, the Clause
was thought to speak for itself.
In any event, through a combination of the Commerce and Privi-
leges and Immunities Clauses, economic unity and the impermissibility
of discrimination based on state citizenship have become elemental
dimensions of the Federal Union. The European and American inter-
state migration principles, though, differ in this respect; while in the
European Union economic unity is a fundamental end in itself, in the
United States economic unity is only an essential part of national unity.
The foundational goals of American free movement and residence
principles go beyond economic unity. Beginning with the Civil War and
the widespread recognition that the states are not independent and sover-
eign States, Congress adopted the Civil War Amendments, particularly
the Fourteenth Amendment, in which it recognized that "[a]l persons
born or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside""' 3 and are entitled to all the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."' 14 In Saenz
v. Roe," ' Justice Stevens addressed the protections a sovereign affords
its citizens, including the absolute freedom of a national citizen to move
to and reside in another constituent political unit. This principle relates
to a unified federal State's economic, social, and political integration -
federal sovereignty and a constitutional citizenship-based freedom of
movement permit federal citizens to live and work throughout the Fed-
eral Union free from constituent state discrimination. It creates a free-
dom to fully transfer constituent state citizenship, while retaining the
same federal citizenship. The new state citizen is free to fully partici-
pate politically and socially and to stand on an equal basis with long-
time state citizens. This freedom includes all the opportunities the con-
stituent state offers its citizens, from educational to occupational pros-
pects, from health and welfare security to environmental quality, cultural
contributions, and the state's tranquility and beauty. In sum, American
free movement is more robust than that currently enjoyed within the
European Union, and its animating purpose - social, economic, and
political unity and national identity - is much broader than the European
Union's "economic integration" purpose.
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis supplied).
114. Id.
115. 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
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III. THE LAW AND CONTROLLING PRINCIPLES FOR FREE MOVEMENT
OF PERSONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
UNITED STATES
A. European Union
Over the years, the ECJ has expanded the meaning and reach of EC
Treaty provisions by endowing European workers' freedom of move-
ment, 16 the right of establishment, ' 7 the freedom to provide services, ' 18
European Union Citizenship," 9 and non-discrimination on the grounds
of nationality, with purposeful life. 12 0 The ECJ's consistent tendency
has been to enhance free movement principles, reaching toward absolute
freedom for European Union citizens to migrate and establish residency
within the Union's Member States. Furthermore, the ECJ has seemed to
resist, and generally narrowly construes, Member State attempts to
restrict free movement principles via treaty-based' 2' and sovereignty-
based justifications. 1
22
The ECJ demonstrated this tendency in some of its earliest deci-
sions. In a 1969 case, a referral from the Supreme German Labor Court,
a German employer refused to treat its Italian worker's performance of
compulsory military service in Italy as employment for the purpose of
seniority and pension benefits, as it would have treated German military
service for German workers. 23 Even though the distinction drawn by
the German employer would have advanced Germany's national security
interests by encouraging German military service, the ECJ determined
that a Member State may not treat its own nationals more advanta-
geously than nationals of other Member States in relation to employ-
ment benefits.' 2 4 Doing so, even in connection to military obligations
and national defense, would violate the European Union's equality of
treatment laws. 2 5 The ECJ has also held that prohibiting discrimination
116. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 39.
117. Id. art. 43.
118. Id. art. 49.
119. Id. arts. 17-18.
120. Id. art. 12.
121. Id. arts. 39.3, 46 (concerning official Member State treatment of foreign nationals on
grounds of public policy, public security, or public health); id. art. 39.4 (concerning the non-
applicability of free movement to employment in the public service); id. art. 18.1 (subjecting
European Union citizens' free movement and residency rights to limitations and conditions laid
down by the EC Treaty and by measures adopted to give the Treaty effect).
122. See discussion accompanying notes 170-185.
123. Case 15/69 Wurttembergishe Milchverwertung-Sudmilch AG v. Ugliola, 1969 E.C.R. 363
(decided under what is now Article 39 of the EC Treaty and European Union regulation 1612/68,
concerning the equality of treatment of workers from other Member States).
124. Id. 3.
125. Id. 6.
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on the basis of nationality is not limited to discrimination emanating
from public authorities but may extend to other entities such as an inter-
national sports organization with activities located within the Union.'
2 6
In Groener v. Minister of Education, the ECJ recognized that
national language requirements that express national identity and cul-
ture, such as Gaelic in Ireland,' 27 may be imposed upon non-nationals
without violating the EC Treaty or European Union anti-discrimination
measures so long as they are not disproportionate in light of the national
objective they seek to achieve."2 8 This is similar to the intermediate
scrutiny standard of review under American Equal Protection jurispru-
dence, where the means to serve interests in the national and cultural
identity must be "substantially related to an important governmental
objective." '129
The ECJ has been generous in determining who may invoke work-
ers' free movement rights. The ECJ extends free movement and resi-
dency rights to part-time, low-wage, and less than minimum wage
workers as long as the work is genuine. 130 Even trainee-teachers benefit
as workers under free movement principles, provided that the trainee-
teacher "performs services for and under the direction of another person
in return for which he receives remuneration."
1 3'
The European Union's Council of Ministers enacted Regulation
1612/68 to implement free movement treaty provisions and to enable
migrant workers' family members to reside with European workers
working and residing in a host Member State. 3 2 Again, in this area the
ECJ has extended free movement rights, compelling the distribution of
significant benefits beyond mere residency to workers' families. In the
Casagrande case, the ECJ considered whether a host Member State was
required to subsidize workers' children by providing them monthly low-
126. Case 36/74, Walrave v. Ass'n Union Cycliste Internationale, 1974 E.C.R. 1405.
127. Gaelic is spoken regularly and fluently by approximately 55,000 Irish in the Republic of
Ireland, which constitutes less than two-percent of the population, although forty-percent of the
3.9 million Irish population identify themselves as fluent in Gaelic. Gaelic's practice and the
reinforcement of the language, however, is perceived as essential to the preservation of Irish
culture, heritage, and identity. See Gaelic Language Gets Official EU Status, USA TODAY, June,
13, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-13-gaelic-x.htm.
128. Case 379/87 Groener v. Minister of Educ., 1989 E.C.R. 3967, 24.
129. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
130. Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1981 E.C.R. 1035, 16, 17. In Case
139/85, Kempf v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1986 E.C.R. 1741, $1 9-12, the ECJ stated that
workers' free movement rights apply to the pursuit of effective and genuine work for marginal and
ancillary activities. Therein, the court used a residency rights analysis to protect a German
national's ability to provide music lessons twelve times per week in the Netherlands.
131. Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wurttemberg, 1986 E.C.R. 2121, 17.
132. Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L 257) 2, art. 10.
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income assistance grants under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68."'
The court recited that under Article 12, "the children of a national of a
Member State who is or has been employed, in the territory of another
Member State shall be admitted to that state's general educational,
apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same consider-
ation as the nationals of that state, if such children are residing in its
territory."' 134 The court found that free mobility standards require "[t]hat
obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated," so the worker
can "be joined by his family and . . . integrat[ed] ... into the host
country."13 5 The ECJ held that to avoid discrimination in favor of the
children of host Member State nationals, monthly assistance grants to
secondary school students from low income families had to be provided
to the children of migrant European workers. 3 6 In Casagrande, this
meant providing grants within Germany to both Italian and German
workers' children.137 Neither the EC Treaty nor European Union legis-
lation had addressed the availability of social assistance benefits to
workers' family members,1 38 although Regulation 1612/68's preamble
states that "obstacles to the mobility of workers shall be eliminated, in
particular as regards the worker's right to be joined by his family and
the conditions for the integration of that family into the host country." 139
In the 1985 Hoeckx case, 4 ' Belgium denied a Dutch national mini-
mum assistance benefits because she had not lived in Belgium for at
least five years. Under Belgian law, non-nationals were entitled to mini-
mum assistance benefits on the condition that they "have actually
resided in Belgium for at least the five years immediately preceding the
date on which the minimum means of subsistence is awarded."' 4 1 The
ECJ held that these benefits constitute a social advantage under Article
7.2 of Regulation 1612/68142 and that a durational residency requirement





138. But, Article 7.2 of Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L 257) 2, does state that such
workers "shall enjoy the same social and tax advantages as national workers." On the other hand,
Article 3 of Council Regulation 93/96 (Oct. 29 1993), addressing students' residency rights, states
that the directive "shall not establish any entitlement to the payment of maintenance grants by the
host Member State on the part of students benefiting from the right of residence."
139. Case 9/74, Casagrande v. Landeshauptstadt Munchen, 1974 E.C.R. 773, 4 (emphasis
supplied).
140. Case 249/83, Hoeckx v. Openbaar Centrum voor Maatchappelijk Welzijn Kalmthout,
1985 E.C.R. 973; see also A.P. Van der Mei, Freedom of Movement for Indigents: A Comparative
Analysis of American Constitutional Law and European Community Law, 19 ARIz. J. INT'L &
COmp. L. 803, 829-849 (2002).
141. Hoeckx, 1985 E.C.R. 773, % 5.
142. See Council Regulation 1612/68, 1968 O.J. (L 257), art. 7.2.
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denying social assistance to a non-national improperly discriminates on
the basis of nationality.143 The ECJ also found that denying benefits to
workers' dependents constitutes discrimination on the basis of national-
ity in violation of Articles 7.1, 7.2, and 10 of Regulation 1612/68.'
Recent cases suggest a more liberal integrative approach to free
movement principles. In the 1998 Martinez Sala case, 4 5 the court con-
sidered a Spanish national's claim for a German child-raising allowance.
Despite having worked intermittently in Germany, the Spanish national
had not worked for over three years and no longer possessed a residence
permit, 1 6 The ECJ decided that the referring court had not furnished
sufficient information to determine whether the Spanish national contin-
ued to be a worker under new Article 39 of the EC Treaty and Regula-
tion 1612/68. The court did, however, determine that once a European
Union citizen has been authorized to reside in a host Member State's
territory, the host Member State cannot discriminate against the citizen
for failure to possess a residency document. 147 The court in effect
extended free movement rights and significant social assistance benefits
to a non-national woman who had not worked in the host Member State
for several years. Its decision implicates the right to residency's mean-
ing as derived from European Union citizenship under Articles 17 and
18.1 of the EC Treaty, rather than Article 39's worker-based right to
residence. 148
Article 17 of the EC Treaty establishes that "[e]very person holding
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union."' 4 9
Article 18.1 mandates the following: "Every citizen shall have the right
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States,
subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by
the measures adopted to give it effect."' 5 ° Article 12 states that "within
the scope of application of this Treaty.. . any discrimination on grounds
143. Hoeckx, 1985 E.C.R. 773, 24-25.
144. See Case 316/85, Centre Public d'Aide Social de Courcelles v. Lebon, 1987 E.C.R. 2811
(confirming the importance of equal treatment of non-national family members where benefits
were deemed to constitute a social advantage to the worker and not to the non-dependent daughter
who was "seeking employment"); Case 32/75, Fiorini v. Socift6 National des Chemins de Fer
Franqais, 1975 E.C.R. 1085.
145. Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. 1-2691.
146. Id. TT 13, 14.
147. Id. It appears from the court's language that if Maria Martinez Sala were not a worker,
then Article 39 of the EC Treaty and Article 7 of Council Regulation 1612/68 would not apply
with respect to this social benefit. However, if she were a lawful resident, the Member State could
not discriminate against her on the basis of nationality. The Spanish national's status as a lawful
resident is not lost merely because of her failure to possess a residence permit.
148. EC Treaty, supra note 27, arts. 17, 18.1, 39.
149. Id. art. 17.1.
150. Id. art. 18.1.
[Vol. 61:331
2007] EU & U.S. CITIZENSHIP, SOVEREIGNTY, AND FREE MOVEMENT 359
of nationality shall be prohibited."'' Taken together, these provisions
prohibit nationality-based discrimination against European Union citi-
zens regarding residency rights and free movement within the European
Union.
Council Directive 93/96 further implements and recognizes stu-
dents' rights of free movement and residence. Students have to assure
relevant national authorities that they have sufficient resources to avoid
burdening the host Member State's social assistance system, are enrolled
in a recognized educational establishment, and are covered by health
insurance for all visits in the host Member State.'" 2 In the Grzelczyk
case, a French national student in his fourth year at a Belgian University
applied to the Belgian Centre for Public Social Assistance for the
minimex, a form of Belgian social assistance usually available only to
low income workers.' 53 The Belgian authorities denied the student's
application because of his nationality.' 54 The Belgium Labor Court rec-
ognized that denying the student social benefits would have constituted
discrimination on the basis of nationality in violation of European Union
law if the student were a worker; however, it was not clear that the
student was entitled to the benefits based on his status as a European
Union citizen-student.15 The ECJ determined that while a host Member
State may take measures to revoke a student's right of residence due to
insufficient resources under Directive 93/96, denial of non-contributory
benefits, such as the minimex, to a lawfully residing student violates
Article 12 of the EC Treaty and constitutes discrimination against a
European citizen on the basis of nationality.1
5 6
In Baumbast, European Union citizens and migrant workers had
installed themselves, their spouses, and their children as U.K.
residents.5 7 The ECJ held that non-working children and spouses,
including non-European spouses, have a continuing right of residence
under Article 18.1 of the EC Treaty, even after the worker and spouse
have divorced and the non-national worker has ceased working in the
host Member State.' 8 According to the ECJ, this right includes the chil-
151. Id. art. 12.
152. Council Directive 93/96, The Right of Residence for Students, 1993 O.J. (L 317) 59.
153. Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignies-Louvainla-Neuve,




157. Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091,
18.
158. Id. i 48-51, 63. In interpreting Article 12 of Council Directive 1612/68, the ECJ also
stated that precluding children from continuing their education and terminating their right to
remain in the host Member State "might dissuade that citizen from exercising rights of freedom of
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dren's right to continue their general education in the host Member State
and the right of the European citizen's former spouse and their children
(even though non-Europeans) to continue to reside in the host Member
States.' 59 The court stated that these derivative rights to residency and
education are essential to facilitate the integration of the migrant worker
into the host Member State and to attain "the aim of Regulation No
1612/68, namely freedom of movement for workers, [that] requires, for
such freedom to be guaranteed in compliance with principles of liberty
and dignity, the best possible conditions for the integration of the Com-
munity worker's family in the society of the host Member State."' 60 As
a result of Mr. Baumbast's European Union citizenship under Articles
17 and 18 of the EC Treaty, the court held that Mr. Baumbast, no longer
a Member State worker, his former spouse, and his children, all pos-
sessed continuing residency rights.' 6 '
Furthermore, the ECJ held that the children had the right to con-
tinue their general education in the host Member State, even though Mr.
Baumbast did not meet the requirement under either European Union or
British law that European Union citizens residing in a host Member
State must carry sickness insurance, including coverage for emergency
treatment provided in the host Member State. 162 The ECJ explicitly rec-
ognized that European Union citizens' right of residency under Article
18.1 of the EC Treaty is subject to limitations and conditions provided
by measures giving Article 18 effect and by European Union direc-
tive. 163 The ECJ also recognized that Member States can require out of
State nationals to be "covered by sickness insurance in respect of all
risks in the host Member State and have sufficient resources to avoid
becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member
State during the period of their residence."'
' 64
But, despite Mr. Baumbast's failure to meet the emergency medical
coverage requirement, the court determined that the U.K. requirement
was a disproportionate interference with both residency rights and the
derivative rights of residence and continued access to education. 165 In
view of Mr. Baumbast's original work-based residency, his continuing
work outside the host Member State, his carriage of comprehensive
movement laid down in Article 39 [of the EC Treaty] and would therefore create an obstacle to the
effective exercise of the freedom thus guaranteed by the EC Treaty." Id. 52.
159. Id. 63.
160. Id. T 50 (emphasis supplied).
161. Id. I 82, 84.
162. Id. 93-94.
163. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 18; Council Directive 90/364, art. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26.
164. Council Directive 90/364, art. 1, 1990 O.J. (L 180) 26 (emphasis supplied).
165. Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091,
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medical insurance in his home Member State, and his financial well-
being, the U.K.'s medical emergency requirement was broader than nec-
essary to achieve the measure's general aim. 16 6 The ECJ decided that
the measure was intended to ensure that the residing European Union
citizen will not become a financial burden upon the host Member
State. 167 The ECJ applied the principle of proportionality, requiring that
Member State measures interfering with fundamental rights be no
broader than necessary to achieve their legitimate objectives, regardless
of whether the measure at issue falls within the "limitations and condi-
tions" language of the Treaty text.1 68 The ECJ has thus moved aggres-
sively to protect free movement principles and enhanced European
citizenship's meaning by: (1) generously construing free movement and
residency principles; and (2) restrictively construing permissible limita-
tions, thereby invigorating European free movement doctrine's purpose
and facilitating European integration somewhat beyond a single internal
market purpose.
169
When the text of Treaty and legislative measures derogate from the
notion of absolute freedom, like Article 18's limitations and conditions
clause and the health insurance requirement of Article 1.1 of Council
Directive 90/364,170 the ECJ narrowly construes the legislative text to
achieve what it sees as free movement's true purpose. The ECJ has
moved beyond European citizenship's initial limited character, perhaps
ignoring the significance of national sovereignty and national citizenship
in the process.
Baumbast's final important point involves the ECJ's narrow appli-
cation of the limitations and conditions clause, which appears in Article
18 of the EC Treaty. This application raises the question of what is the
court's proper role in interpreting Member States' treaty-based protec-
tions in support of economic security, national identity, and national
security. In Baumbast, the court used the principle of proportionality to
restrict the scope of the limitations and conditions clause, circumscribing
the Member States' ability to exercise control over non-national Euro-
pean citizens' labor and residency within their'borders. This is troubling
for the Member States because this lack of control may hinder their abil-
166. Id. 92-93.
167. Id. [ 90.
168. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 18.1.
169. The ECJ characterized Union citizenship as being "destined to be the fundamental status
of nationals of the Member States." Baumbast, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091, 82 (citing Case C-184/99,
Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d'Aide Sociale d'Ottignies-Louvainla-Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. 1-6193, [
31).
170. Council Directive 90/364, art. 1.1, 1990 O.J. (L180) 26.
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ity to safeguard the public interest.'71 At the same time, however, the
principle of proportionality enhances free movement's effectiveness.
This may be another example of the familiar freedom versus secur-
ity quandary with which we are familiar in the United States. The ECJ
is following a pattern of restraining Member State actions that tend to
limit free movement's broad application, but at what cost? For example,
the ECJ has stated that the notion of public policy must be interpreted
strictly if the Member State justifies its action based on public policy or
public security in derogation of "the fundamental principles of equality
of treatment and freedom of movement of workers."' 2 Furthermore, the
ECJ has stated that with respect to public security, "restrictions cannot
be imposed on the right of a national of any Member State to enter the
territory of another Member State . . . unless his presence or conduct
constitutes a genuine and serious threat to public policy."' 73 In sum, the
Member States should not place restrictions on European citizens' fun-
damental rights, save for those that are "necessary for the protection" of
national security or public safety.' 7 4 Measures taken on public security
grounds must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the indi-
vidual affected by the restriction.'75 Apparently, the Member States
must now approach some security issues based on an individual non-
national's characteristics, rather than based on broader class-based pol-
icy choices.
In Baumbast, the court used the proportionality principle to narrow
the Member States' power to restrict free movement. The court
examined the Member State's legislative objective, to circumscribe
power that encroaches on fundamental European Union principles such
as free movement. When the ECJ finds the legislative objective suffi-
ciently important, it evaluates76 whether the measure is necessary and
171. Some Treaty provisions explicitly reserve such power to the Member States. For
example, Article 39.3 of the EC Treaty states that the right of free movement is "subject to
limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health." EC Treaty,
supra note 27, art. 39.3. Another example is Article 39.4, which states that the free movement
principles "shall not apply to employment in the public service." Id. art. 39.4.
172. Case 36/75, Rutili v. Ministre de l'Intdrieur, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 27.
173. Id. 28.
174. Id. 32.
175. See Case 67/74, Bonsignore v. Oberstadtdirektor der Stadt Koln, 1975 E.C.R. 297; see
also Case 115/81, Adoui v. Belgian State and City of Liege, 1982 E.C.R. 1665, § 2
("Circumstances not related to the specific case may not be relied upon in respect of citizens of the
community, as justification for measures intended to safeguard public policy and public
security.").
176. As in Baumbast, the ECJ's "evaluation" is often rather limited. The court often points out
that a measure interpreted in a way that interferes with a treaty-based right is disproportionate
under the recited facts without undertaking a thorough evaluation. See, e.g., Case C-413/99,
Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091, 93.
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appropriate to achieve the objective, or whether it sweeps too broadly,
unnecessarily and disproportionately restricting free movement princi-
ples when a more limited restriction would do. 177 The ECJ, though, is
often less than thorough when conducting the proportionality analy-
sis: 178 once the court announces that it will apply the proportionality test,
it moves directly to its conclusion that the law sweeps too broadly, virtu-
ally presuming a violation of the principle and the Treaty. The court
applies the analytical framework in a fashion that in some ways resem-
bles the application of the "strict scrutiny" standard of review the United
States Supreme Court uses when state actors encroach upon Americans'
fundamental rights or discriminate against suspect classes of citizens. 1
79
In these cases, under the Equal Protection Clause or a fundamental rights
provision, American courts presume that a state law encroaching upon a
fundamental right is unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state objective. 8 ° American courts, however, usu-
ally include a more thoroughgoing analysis, even with the presumption.
The right's fundamental character justifies an American or Euro-
pean court's searching analysis of the constituent state's policy choices.
As previously described, in Baumbast, Mr. Baumbast's residency right,
as a former worker and European citizen, and his spouse and children's
derivative rights, are explicitly subject to "limitations and conditions
laid down by the Treaty and by measures adopted to give it effect."'
8 1
Article 1.1 of Directive 90/364, the measure adopted to give the "limita-
tions and conditions clause" effect, sets forth certain conditions that
Member States may adopt to restrict residency, thus subordinating free
movement principles to the Member States' legitimate interests. 82 As
aforementioned, one of the permissible conditions is the medical insur-
ance requirement for all risks occurring in the host Member State. The
U.K. required medical emergency coverage for all care provided in the
U.K. This seemed to fall quite clearly within the Directive's "all risks"
language. The ECJ rejected the treaty-based limitation as a meaningful
part of European citizenship's free movement principle. Additionally,
the ECJ failed to appreciate the relationship between national sover-
177. Id. 91.
178. Id. 93.
179. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (stating the two prong
examination under the strict scrutiny standard); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny analysis); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
180. See supra note 171 and cases cited therein.
181. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 18.1; see also Council Directive 90/364, art 1.1, 1990 O.J.
(L 180) 26.
182. Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091,
90.
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eignty and citizenship and the Member States' right to control a non-
national's residency rights.
The ECJ did not even complete its own proportionality analysis.
Without conducting a thorough inquiry, the ECJ simply concluded that
the means chosen were not necessary and appropriate to attain the Mem-
ber State's objective. 83 The court found that requiring non-national
European citizens to carry medical emergency coverage specific to the
host Member State prevented these citizens from claiming residency
rights under Article 18.1 and was a disproportionate response in terms of
seeking to avoid "an unreasonable burden on the public finances of the
host Member State."' 84 While the ECJ may have come to a just result
regarding Mr. Baumbast's particular impact on U.K. finances, the deci-
sion's implications reach beyond its peculiar facts. The court's opinion
deeply undermines the Member States' retained sovereignty to control
non-nationals' residency rights and blurs the essential and legitimate dif-
ferences between sovereignty-based citizenship and European Union cit-
izenship, both of which can otherwise retain their vitality under the
Treaty provisions. The court seemingly went beyond what was neces-
sary to effectuate the European Union's "single internal market" pur-
pose. None of the affected parties were working in the host Member
State, nor did they necessarily intend to work there. What is more, all
but Mr. Baumbast were not European Union citizens. The European
Union's economic interest in narrowing the limitations and conditions
clause is tenuous at best.
The ECJ's Baumbast decision encourages judicial second-guessing.
It also reduces the limitations and conditions clause's reach to issues the
court deems essential to effecting the Member State's legitimate objec-
tives. This is a far cry from the Directive's guideline that plainly
requires coverage of all risks in the host Member State.
These cases tend to demonstrate at least two trends. First, via its
application of European Union Treaty law, the ECJ has made a serious
attempt to provide all European Union citizens with nearly absolute free
movement and residency rights. This remains true even in the face of
Member States' sovereignty-based interests; for example, their right to
protect their economic well-being. This flies in the face of treaty provi-
sions that appear to subordinate free movement principles to the Mem-
ber States' legitimate interests. Second, where fundamental European
Union principles are at stake, the ECJ tends to narrow Member States'
sovereignty-based powers. In this context, the court's scrutiny is akin to
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citizenship principles are at stake. But, even though the court's interpre-




Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution
states that "[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." While there was
almost no discussion regarding the Clause's meaning during the Federal
Convention of 1787, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina claimed to
have introduced the Clause.1 86 He introduced his observations of the
Plan of Government to the Federal Convention on May 28, 1787;
therein, Pinckney stated that the fourth article of his plan "is formed
exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the present Confedera-
tion" 18 7 In the Articles of Confederation, the fourth article provided that
"the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from
any other state."' 88 This "ingress and regress" component was not
explicitly included in the constitutional text. This right may, however,
be implicit in the Privileges and Immunities Clause or may have been
"conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the
stronger Union the Constitution created."' 89 Although the right to travel
is often a subject of debate,19° the United States Supreme Court has con-
sistently affirmed it.191 Early on, Justice Bushrod Washington declared
that "the right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any
other state," is one of the "fundamental" rights protected by the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause.' 92
The Privileges and Immunities Clause 93 more explicitly protects
the right to travel's second component.194 Under the Clause, when
entering into another state, an American citizen is entitled to many of the
185. The danger here is that citizens, national legislatures, and national courts will have little
guidance regarding how to carefully design appropriate limitations on residency when legitimate
Member State interests are at stake. The ECJ's policy judgments are subject to claims that the
court is producing arbitrary and vague reasoning.
186. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 174 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
187. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
188. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1777).
189. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); see also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
500-501 (1999).
190. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177-181 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring).
191. Id.; see also Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 49 (1867).
192. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
193. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
194. This analysis follows the "three component" framework for the right to travel described
by Justice Stevens in Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
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same benefits enjoyed by that state's residents. For example, a Penn-
sylvania resident entering New Jersey would be entitled to many of the
same benefits enjoyed by New Jersey's residents. The questions left
unanswered, however, are: (1) what are these protected Privileges and
Immunities; and (2) are there any circumstances under which a state
may limit them? As to limiting circumstances, the focus is on the "priv-
ileges and immunities" that a non-resident has when entering or engag-
ing in activities in a state on a temporary, or perhaps intermittent, basis.
The freedom to reside in another state is not involved in this second
component. 1
95
Justice Washington included in the activities embraced by the Priv-
ileges and Immunities Clause the "[p]rotection by the government; the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess prop-
erty of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety."'
1 96
Despite these enumerated principles, the Court once found that Penn-
sylvania residents, who were harvesting oysters in New Jersey, were not
protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause against a New Jersey
law banning non-resident oyster harvesting. Today, however, these
activities would likely be protected.1 97
Members of Congress, while introducing and debating the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause present in the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment, largely endorsed Justice Washington's view that "Privileges and
Immunities" meant fundamental rights, rather than merely public bene-
fits of all sorts.' 98 Recently, however, the Clause's meaning, and per-
haps the meaning of "fundamental rights," too, have expanded to include
important economic activities and the right to earn a livelihood. 9 9 In
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Commission, Justice Blackmun rec-
ognized this right to earn a livelihood or pursue a common calling as
"bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity," but distin-
195. This freedom to enjoy Privileges and Immunities on a temporary or intermittent basis
upon entering or conducting activities in another state is akin to the freedom to provide services
under Articles 49-55 of the EC Treaty, supra note 27, which largely focuses on the right to engage
in business activities, trades, professional work, and the like on a temporary or intermittent basis,
as opposed to doing so on a permanent or indefinite basis under the freedom of establishment in
Articles 43-48 or the free movement of workers in Articles 39-42.
196. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
197. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (applying the Privileges and Immunities
Clause to invalidate South Carolina's higher license fees for non-resident-owned commercial
shrimping boats).
198. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 476, 2545, 2765, 2767 (1866); see generally
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONsTrruTION 433-51
(West 1990); John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1418 (1992).
199. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978); see generally
Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487 (1981).
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guished it from mere elk hunting by a non-state citizen in Montana,
which when granted on more favorable terms to Montana citizens did
not threaten any basic right.2° Justice Blackmun, however, may not
have considered the discrimination's impact on the ability of guides,
outfitters, lodges, and other businesses, supporting hunters and fisher-
men, to earn a livelihood.
In Toomer v. Witsell, the Court held that South Carolina could not
charge prohibitively large license fees to out-of-state commercial
shrimpers while charging very low fees to state resident shrimpers. z 1
This discrimination, even though put in place to conserve the shrimp
supply and to curb excessive trawling, was not a justifiable interference
with the right of non-resident commercial fishers to earn a livelihood.2 °2
In Hughes v. Oklahoma, °3 the Court again rejected a state's position
that discrimination was necessary to preserve the state's wildlife and
natural resources. The Court invalidated Oklahoma's ban on transport-
ing minnows out of Oklahoma as interfering with interstate commerce
and as discriminating on the basis of state residency in violation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.20 4 The Court has also found that a
municipal law that allocated public construction contracts on the basis of
municipal residency discriminated against non-New Jersey residents, as
well as against non-Camden County residents, in relation to the pursuit
of public works construction jobs.20 5 The Court characterized this as the
pursuit of a "common calling" and a "basic and essential activity"
wherein individuals would be put at a disadvantage due to state citizen-
ship, and therefore, such pursuits "fall within the purview of the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause. 20 6 In Supreme Court of New Hampshire
v. Piper, the Court determined that because the practice of law is
"important to the national economy" and "fundamental" in that its prac-
titioners often represent persons with unpopular claims in federal court,
it is a "privilege" under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1.207
On the other hand, the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not
protect all non-resident activities from discrimination on the basis of
residency. The Court has held that certain recreational activities, such as
elk hunting in Montana, are not the kind of activities that are sufficiently
important to the national economy and have no "bearing upon the vital-
200. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383.
201. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 403.
202. Id.
203. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
204. Id. at 325-36.
205. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221 (1984).
206. Id. at 218-19.
207. 470 U.S. 274, 281 (1985).
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ity of the Nation as a single entity."2 8 Thus, some such activities are
not deemed to be a basic right or privilege under the clause. 2"
The Piper Court addressed the issue of when, if at all, discrimina-
tion against non-residents exercising a privilege or immunity is justifia-
ble.2"' The Court stated that the "Clause does not preclude
discrimination against nonresidents where (i) there is substantial reason
for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced
against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's objec-
tive."2'' In this analytical framework, a substantial reason could be that
non-residents "constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the [discrimi-
natory] statute is aimed."2 ' 2 Moreover, the discrimination's breadth and
nature must be close or substantially related to the particular evil that it
is intended to remedy. In this "close or substantial relationship" context,
courts will look to see if there are any less restrictive means of achieving
the state's objective.2" 3 This analytical framework, while not character-
ized as strict scrutiny, is similar to a strict scrutiny analysis. It is also
analogous to the proportionality framework the ECJ uses to determine
whether a Member State's limitation on free movement principles is
valid.2 14
In American constitutional law, the right to travel's third compo-
nent encompasses non-residents' right to move from one state to another
to reside, work, and share in the benefits of that state's citizenship and
residency. It is a right to establish a home, to work, attend schools, and
participate in the state's political life. In this aspect, the right to travel is
at its apex. This subset of rights plainly distinguishes citizens', particu-
larly American citizens', rights and benefits from those of non-citizens.
According to Justice Stevens, this aspect of the right to travel is pro-
tected "not only by the new arrival's status as a state citizen, but also by
her status as a citizen of the United States."2 5 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Privileges or Immunities Clause precludes states from depriving
208. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 385 (1978) (also recognizing
that voting and state elective office candidacy are activities in which a state may prohibit non-
residents from engaging).
209. Id. at 388.
210. Piper, 470 U.S. at 284.
211. Id.
212. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948).
213. Piper, 470 U.S. at 284.
214. See Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002 E.C.R. 1-7091,
92-93 (holding that a Member State's differential treatment of a non-national must be aimed at
a legitimate Member State objective and must be no broader than necessary to achieve that
objective).
215. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-03 (1999).
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American citizens of privileges or immunities, whereas Article IV pro-
tects privileges and immunities of state citizenship.
While Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell declared that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause protected a citizen's right "to reside in
any other state, for the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pur-
suits or otherwise," other courts have not seen fit to rest the right of
residency and the right to the benefits of state citizenship on Article
IV.2 16 In Edwards v. California, the Court held that a state's prohibition
of bringing a non-resident indigent person into the state constituted an
unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce in violation of the Com-
merce Clause.' 1 7 The Court found that transporting people constituted
"commerce" under the Commerce Clause's meaning.21 8 In an eloquent
concurrence, Justice Douglas, joined by two Justices, insisted that "the
free movement of persons throughout this nation is a right of national
citizenship."219
In Shapiro v. Thompson, two states and the District of Columbia
denied welfare benefits to residents who had not resided in the states or
the District for at least one year before applying for assistance.22 ° With-
out explicitly citing a source for the result, the Court found that the dura-
tional residency requirement for welfare benefits implicated the right to
travel interstate.22' It also stated that the right "occupies a position fun-
damental to the concept of our Federal Union. '222 Since each statute or
statutory provision created two classes of residents, each treated differ-
ently, the Court evaluated the issue under the Equal Protection Clause
and declared that "any classification which serves to penalize the exer-
cise of [the right to travel and reside in another state], unless shown to
be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
216. 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
217. 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
218. Id. at 172.
219. Id. at 178-180. While this case involved discrimination against non-residents, the
discrimination at issue also seemed to constitute a prohibition or penalty against obtaining
California residency. If the case was viewed in this light, the Court should probably not have
relied on a Commerce Clause analysis. The fact that Edwards could be viewed in these two
separate, but perhaps complementary lights underscores the uncertainty surrounding the source of
Americans' free movement rights. Is the source the Commerce Clause, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, or some combination of each?
220. 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
221. Id. at 630. The Court did, however, reference Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 546, 552, Paul v.
Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12 (1976),
which grounded the durational residency requirement in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2. See also Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177-80 (Douglas, J., concurring) (relying on
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Edwards, 314 U.S. at 172-73
(relying on Article I's Commerce Clause); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 (1908).
222. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)).
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unconstitutional. 223
Not all durational residency requirements, however, have been
struck down. Some are closely tied to the determination of the genuine-
ness of a new arrival's purported residency. For example, creating an
irrebutable presumption that out-of-state students cannot establish resi-
dency to avoid paying out-of-state university tuition is unconstitutional
as a violation of the Due Process Clause.224 A state, however, can
require out-of-state students to reside in the state for a year and pay the
higher non-resident tuition before qualifying for in-state residence tui-
tion. Presumably because out-of-state students often leave the state after
graduation, one year is a reasonable period in which to establish the
genuineness or good faith of residency and state citizenship.225 In Sosna
v. Iowa, the Court also upheld a one-year requirement for establishing
residency in the state for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.226 This
residency requirement was acceptable because the state had a legitimate
interest in restricting those seeking to use its courts to change fundamen-
tal family relationships. 227 But in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court deter-
mined that a one-year state-residency requirement and a three-month
county-residency requirement for voting registration were unconstitu-
tional.228 And in Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, the Court
found that a one-year county-residency requirement for new Arizona
residents to obtain non-emergency hospitalization or medical care at
public expense was unconstitutional. 229  The Court determined that
denying medical care, "a basic necessity of life," to indigents constituted
a severe penalty on their right to travel, and that economic burdens and
administrative efficiency, among other reasons cited, were not the "com-
pelling state interest[s]" needed to meet the strict scrutiny applied to
right-to-travel impingements.23 °
223. Id. at 634.
224. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453 (1973).
225. Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 240 (D. Minn 1970), afftd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971).
With university students who have moved from out-of-state, there may also be a presumption that
the students remain permanent residents of another state, reflected by their ties to and dependency
on their out-of-state resident parents. Under the presumption, that residence, where the students
may spend substantial non-school time, can be viewed as a continuation of their pre-university
residency.
226. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 409-10 (1975).
227. Id. at 406-08.
228. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). Subsequent cases established that fifty days is a
reasonable period of time in which to properly register new residents, and, therefore, it is a fitting
durational residency requirement for voting. See, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681
(1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 686-87 (1973).
229. Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974).
230. Id. at 259 (quoting H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH CONo., DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC., AND WELFARE REPORT ON MED. RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF PUB.
ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS 74 (Comm. Print 1961)). Id. at 267-69.
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It may have been difficult for the Court to invalidate one-year dura-
tional residency requirements in some contexts - for example, divorce
and in-state tuition - at the time these decisions were made. However,
today one might ask whether these judgments are truly compatible with
the notion of "one nation, one people." It certainly need not take more
than a couple of months, if that, to establish the genuineness of one's
residency. Once a citizen establishes state residency, there does not
appear to be a legitimate reason to deny the benefits of state residency.
Assuming "good faith" and genuineness, 2 3' recent arrivals' residency
intentions should be no more suspect than those of long-term state
citizens.
Requiring assurance that a person seeking palpable benefits has
established state residency in good faith is compatible with the concept
of a full right to interstate migration - the right to travel embedded in the
"one nation, one people" principle. This recognition aside, American
courts, perhaps reflecting a historic American - or perhaps human -
wariness of strangers, have not yet been as willing to accept the "one
nation, one people" principle in its full flowering, as its essence
demands.
Roberto Morales - who was born in 1969 in McAllen, Texas, to
Mexican parents - left Reynosa, Mexico, in 1977 to live with his sister
and attend school in Texas, but state law denied him the tuition-free
education available to other Texas-resident children.232 He was depied
these benefits because he lived apart from a "parent, guardian, or other
person having lawful control of him under an order of a court" and was
living in the school district "for the primary purpose of attending the
public free schools. 233 Texas law would have admitted Roberto if he
resided with his parent or legal guardian within the school district.234
His sister was neither.235 The Supreme Court characterized the Texas
law as a "bona fide residence requirement," simply requiring that one
establish residence before demanding services that are provided for
residents, thus assuring the state that such services - here, free public
education - be enjoyed only by state residents. 6  According to the
231. States will likely take the determination of what constitutes genuine good faith residency
quite seriously. States may well require clear and objective demonstrations of one's new
residence, including showing an intent to remain indefinitely. For example, states might presume
that students who remain dependent on their parents in relation to income, tuition, housing
payments, and auto and health insurance payments have not sufficiently severed their connection
to their parents' residence to have genuinely established residency in their new state.
232. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 322-23 (1983).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 323.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 333.
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Court, because the "living apart" limitation was merely part of the defi-
nition of residency, satisfying that bona fide residence definition does
not at all interfere with the constitutional right of interstate travel.2 37 As
such, the Court did not apply the "strict scrutiny" standard of review.238
Ordinarily, state residency, which is the equivalent of state citizen-
ship,2 39 requires: (1) physical presence in the state; and (2) intention to
remain indefinitely. 24 ° The Court has also approved a more rigorous
standard for "domicile," sometimes, though not always, the equivalent
of "residence."'241 Specifically, the Court has required a showing that an
individual have a "true, fixed and permanent home and place of habita-
tion" to which, whenever she leaves, she has the intention of
returning.242 While it is unlikely that having a true, fixed, permanent
home is required under most residency definitions, mere transient lodg-
ing is not enough. Intent to remain does not preclude planning to live in
another place in the future, so long as there is a present intent to remain
for some indefinite length of time. Intent to remain would ordinarily be
"inferred from an actual presence accompanied with such circumstances
as usually surround a home. 2 43
Surely, in today's extraordinarily mobile society, the character or
purported length of one's intent to remain at one's present abode
requires flexibility. A logical step might be a presumption in favor of
intent to remain, unless proven otherwise. The Martinez Court largely
focused on the Petitioner's facial challenge to the Texas law and, con-
comitantly, on the law's residency definition. The Court did not place
enough emphasis on Roberto Morales's American citizenship. He was
an American citizen living in Texas with his biological sister, seeking to
attend a local school.
2 4
In terms of free movement rights, Martinez does not compare
favorably with the ECJ's Baumbast decision. Recall that in Baumbast,
Mr. Baumbast's children were not British but were given continued
access to British schools. In contrast in Martinez, the United States
237. Id. at 322, 333.
238. Id. at 328.
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
240. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 330 (1983).
241. See Penfield v. Chesapeake, Ohio & Sw. R.R. Co., 134 U.S. 351 (1890); Mitchell v.
United States, 88 U.S. 350 (1874).
242. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 454 (1973) (quoting Op. Att'y Gen. (1972) (unreported)).
243. North Yarmouth v. West Gardiner, 58 Me. 207, 211 (1870); see also Inhabitants of
Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 Me. 406, 418 (1857) (cited in Justice Marshall's dissent
in Martinez, 461 U.S. at 339).
244. As Justice Brennan suggested in his Martinez concurrence, Roberto Morales's residency
in the United States and Texas, as well as his American citizenship, may compel another
conclusion: under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Morales
must be a citizen, and therefore a resident, of Texas. See Martinez, 461 U.S. at 333.
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Supreme Court was unnecessarily grudging in upholding Texas' denial
of public school access to an American child living with a biological
family member within a Texas school district. Unlike the ECJ, the
Supreme Court's application of free movement and residency principles
was unduly rigid. It seems that requiring the child's parent or guardian
to reside within the school district is more restrictive than necessary to
serve the state's legitimate interests. Providing public education to a
child who was born in Texas, is an American citizen, and lives with his
sister in the relevant Texas school district does not undermine Texas'
interests in preserving the benefits of state citizenship for state residents.
Like other similarly situated individuals, Roberto might remain in Texas
for postsecondary education or work and perhaps raise a family there.
Beyond these points, even though the Roberto Moraleses of our
world are not moving from another state, but from another nation, the
foundational "one nation, one people" principle. is best served by
presuming that state obstacles to free movement embedded in technical
residency definitions violate free movement principles when applied to
American citizens. Under these circumstances, the state should shoulder
the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that its residency requirement
is carefully designed to advance a compelling state interest.
In the most recent American right-to-interstate-migration case,
Saenz v. Roe, Justice Stevens re-categorized free movement cases,
breaking "the right to travel" into three components. The third compo-
nent - the right of an American citizen to travel to, reside in, and enjoy
the full benefits of citizenship in another state - provides new arrivals
the same privileges and immunities that other state citizens enjoy.245 In
Saenz, the Court considered the constitutional validity of a California
law that limited the amount of public assistance benefits available to
families that had resided in the state for less than twelve months. Spe-
cifically, the law limited the available benefits to the amount for which
245. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). The first component is the right to cross state
borders, the right of free ingress and regress. This right's source has varied, but it originally
stemmed from Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, which was the forerunner of Article IV,
Section 2, of the United States Constitution. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172-73
(1941). The second, the right of citizens to travel to other states to engage in business or a trade or
other livelihood, to obtain health care, to buy property, or to go to court - basic and essential
activities bearing upon the vitality of the nation as a single entity - is expressly protected by
Article IV, Section 2's text. See, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,
279-80 (1985); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401 (1948); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,
551-52 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). And finally, the third component is the ight to move to
another state, to reside and share fully in the benefits of state citizenship. See, e.g., Zobel v.
Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969), overruled in
part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). This fight's source has been debated and was
not settled until Justice Stevens' Saenz opinion discussed herein.
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those families would have qualified in their prior state of residence.246
The benefit differential for some of the new citizen claimants was less
than a third of the monthly amount that similarly situated Californians
would have received. 47 California's purpose was to reduce its welfare
budget by approximately $10.9 million. 48 At the time, California's
benefits were among the most generous in the nation. 49
Although the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause, coupled with its sister Citizenship Clause, has been rarely uti-
lized since the Slaughter-House2 5 0 decisions virtually eviscerated its sig-
nificance, Justice Stevens rekindled its doctrinal utility. Under the "one
nation, one people" principle, American citizens are citizens of the state
in which they reside, on an equal basis with all other citizens of that
state.
The Court, by a 7-2 margin, struck down the California law on the
grounds that it created unequal classes of citizens and erected an imper-
missible obstacle to free interstate migration t.2 1  The California law's
purpose of preserving state revenues was undoubtedly a legitimate inter-
est, but it was not sufficiently compelling to justify the fundamental ine-
quality it created. 2  Using the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause, coupled with the Citizenship Clause, makes legal
sense and creates sound policy. The Citizenship Clause's guarantees of
American citizenship for those born or naturalized in the United States
and state citizenship to all American citizens residing in any state, cou-
pled with the Privileges or Immunities Clause's prohibition against state
abridgement of Americans' privileges or immunities, connects the "one
nation, one people" principle to both American citizenship and state
residency.2 53 According to Justice Stevens, equal residency rights are
the logical result of an individual's "status as a citizen of the United
States[,]" as well as their "status as a state citizen. '2 54 This resulting
246. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 492.
247. Id. at 494.
248. Id. at 497.
249. Id. at 492.
250. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80-81 (1872), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in United States v.
Ruiz, 961 F. Supp. 1524 (D. Utah 1997), where the Court, when considering the application of the
new Privileges or Immunities Clause to a difference in treatment of New Orleans slaughterhouses
and the creation of a monopoly by one of them, determined that the Amendment meant very little,
certainly little more than what protections were then available under Article IV, Section 2.
251. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505-07 (1999).
252. Id. at 504. There, the Court somewhat cryptically stated, "[n]either mere rationality nor
some intermediate standard of review should be used .... The appropriate standard may be more
categorical than that articulated in Shapiro ... but it is surely no less strict."
253. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
254. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502.
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status is also
plainly identified in the opening words of the Fourteenth
Amendment:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; . . 255
Justice Stevens could have easily relied on Article IV, Section 2's
Privileges and Immunities Clause, which prevents states from discrimi-
nating against residents of other states.256 But, as Justice Stevens may
have recognized, characterizing the discrimination as between residents
of the same state based upon time of arrival, rather than as discrimina-
tion against former residents of another state, is a better rationale for
upholding an affirmative citizenship-based right. Under Article IV, the
constitutional violation would have been more an incidental burden on
the rights of former non-residents, rather than a collision between the
discriminatory restriction and the clear right to reside as newly arrived
residents under the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
As a consequence of Saenz, American case law and free movement
principles reflect the close connection between citizenship - particularly
national citizenship and state citizenship through national citizenship -
and "the one nation, one people" principle. In our modern, highly
mobile society, the march towards absolutely free interstate migration
within our sovereign federal nation is inexorable.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON SOVEREIGNTY AND CITIZENSHIP
Years ago my wife, Kathy, and I visited Fogo Island off the coast
of Newfoundland. We visited the island's eastern edge, a windswept
expanse jutting into the North Atlantic. We passed through Tilting Har-
bour, a small village filled with wood-frame homes and Irish surnames,
before arriving at the village of Joe Batt's Arm. Our hosts viewed us
and our canoe-adorned station wagon with apparent skepticism until we
assured them that we were not "Greenpeacers." We were invited in, but
our initial conversation proved stilted. Except for our common language
and their daughter's affinity for television advertisement jingles, we had
little in common. Did an American-Canadian couple and a Canadian
island family really lack any common ground? The husband, attempting
to find one, tantalized us with tales of his gastrointestinal afflictions.
255. Id. at 503 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
256. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
257. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504-05 (1999).
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After sharing that unqualified delight, our host inquired as to why we
had visited the Catholics in Tilting. God-fearing fundamentalists like
our hosts, had not - and never would - visit Tilting. Never mind that
Tilting was the only other town with which they shared this small,
remote island. For all intents and purposes, Fogo Island contained the
spatial, identity, and security characteristics of a sovereign land. Only
the daughter desired to visit the mainland and experience the outside
world.
We continued to talk about our travels and lives. But we were as
strange to them as they were to us. They were secure in Joe Batt's Arm,
and its values, but nowhere else. There they found freedom and happi-
ness in fishing, hunting, and enjoying an undisturbed family, church,
and village life - all without "Greenpeacers," Catholics, and other out-
siders gumming up the works.
Years before, I had visited Brittany on France's Channel coast. I
traveled with a friend whose family had migrated to Paris from Brittany.
His Breton cousins lived well off the beaten path in a small village on
the bluffs overlooking the Channel. They did not technically live on an
island, but they might as well have. They spoke no French, fished and
collected seaweed from the coast, wore wooden shoes, drove oxcarts
with spoke-less wooden wheels, and offered us warm, unprocessed milk
and a moist, dark concoction we could hardly stomach. The toothless
women smiled at us. We spoke to each other and to them without
understanding a word the other offered. The men were all drunk on hard
cider, coming in from the day's fishing. Their lives and their commu-
nity were not ours, but they were as secure in their world as we were in
ours. We provided a bit of novelty, but they were likely relieved when
we left. Was there free movement between this community and the rest
of Europe, or the rest of France for that matter? More importantly, did
these people care one way or the other? The answer is probably no on
both accounts.
All communities face boundaries in one form or another, be it
water, sand, a deep cultural divide, or national borders. People often
find security and freedom in the sea, in the hills, or in sheer distance -
borders that separate them from cultures and values that would clash
with their own. Ironically, people sometimes long to be free from differ-
ence, from strangeness. Hannah Arendt has said:
Freedom, where it existed as a tangible reality, has always been spa-
tially limited. This is especially clear for the greatest and most ele-
mentary of all negative liberties, the freedom of movement; the
borders of national territory or the walls of the citystate compre-
hended and protected a space in which men could move freely ....
What is true for freedom of movement is, to a large extent, valid for
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freedom in general. Freedom in a positive sense is possible only
among equals, and equality itself is by no means a universally valid
principle but, again, applicable only with limitations and even within
spatial limits.
218
She sees these communities as spaces of freedom and in the politi-
cal realm "as islands in a sea or as oases in a desert. ' 25 9 The security
isolated communities can provide contrasts with the hopelessness out-
siders, lacking their own community, often experience.26 °
Some would argue that this view is, at least in part, outdated, view-
ing borders more "as arbitrary from a moral point of view."2 6 ' From this
latter view, sovereignty somewhat arbitrarily compartmentalizes the
planet, makes self-determination by national peoples difficult, and per-
mits sovereign states to use powerful force against peoples within a
sovereign state, whether Kurds, Chechens, or Aborigines.262 These are
critical concerns crying out for principled discussion in a world in which
power often counts for more than right or justice. In this world of
"globalization," some would also assert that our sense of community and
place is changing, that the "either-or" character of state sovereignty and
human plight, which feeds on and reinforces the importance of "strange-
ness" and "familiarity," is being replaced by transnational dimensions
and structure that expand familiarity beyond the nation-state and wel-
come difference, even strangeness.2 63
A less sovereignty-intensive system - perhaps one including con-
stituent nation-state parts similar to the European Union - may be able
to impart a greater sense of freedom and security within an ever larger
community by welcoming neighbors from faraway places, whether dis-
tant in terms of geography or culture, to live and work together. The
European Union of the not-so-distant future may be the emerging
blueprint for the larger-than-nation-state system, capable of protecting
peoples who represent disparate national communities.
258. Hans Lindahl, Finding a Place for Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Union's
Claim to Territorial Unity, 29 EUR. L. REv. 461, 462 (2004) (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, ON
REVOLUTION 275 (Penguin Books 1990) (1963)). Perhaps this explains the fighting and tension in
places like Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Iraq, Chechnya, Basque country, and
Ireland.
259. Id. at 463.
260. Id. (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 286 (Harcourt Brace
1951)).
261. See JULES L. COLEMAN & SARAH K. HARDING, Citizenship, the Demands of Justice, and
the Moral Relevance of Political Borders, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 18 (Warren F. Schwartz ed.,
1995).
262. See, e.g., LAWRENCE T. FARLEY, PLEBISCITES AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE CRISIS OF
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 6-20 (Westview Press 1986).
263. See Lindahl, supra note 258, at 463-64 (citing ULRICH BECK, WHAT Is GLOBALISATION?
74 (Cambridge Polity Press 2000)).
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An enlarging European federal system, guided by the ECJ's imper-
fect, yet principled decisions, could create a transnational community
offering truly free movement. Ideally, over time, this beyond-sover-
eignty logic could also extend to other continent-wide areas, and, in
time, a worldwide community, peopled by world citizens, possessing
universal equality - at least, equality in terms of those values selected as
worthy of legal protection or viewed as otherwise necessary.26 4
Borders and traditional notions of sovereignty and citizenship,
though, may have more moral significance in today's world of sharpen-
ing cultural, ethnic, religious, and political difference. Security may be
a competing rather than a complementary objective. The security, social
and cultural protections, and the effective distribution of resources
needed for a community to thrive are often better served on a smaller
scale. The full freedoms that facilitate a people's capacity to thrive,
including the freedom from fear, are more likely nourished in a discrete,
spatially bounded political community that is based upon a consensus of
values, including a cultural ethos. A world of Fogo Islanders, Bretons,
Basques, Kurds, French, Japanese, and many others is probably not yet
ready for "blended" communities consisting of the strange and unfamil-
iar. The European Union, represented by European citizenship, free
movement within the internal market, and an emerging federal system of
justice, may improve Europeans' lives, but even the European Union
faces cohesiveness limits, as evidenced by its aforementioned failure to
ratify the European Constitution. The European Union is not yet the
primary guarantor and provider of Europeans' basic security and cultural
identity.
In the United States, the notion of dual sovereignty - a federal sov-
ereignty, combined with a residual state sovereignty embodied by the
Tenth Amendment - persists today and is perhaps most identified with
more conservative legal minds, like Justice Scalia, for example. 65 As
applied to the states, however, Justice Scalia's broad use of the term
"sovereignty" is an understandable, though perhaps mistaken, use of the
term.266 It is an understandable use because since the Republic's begin-
ning, the American states have often been labeled sovereign. James
Madison referred to them under the Articles of Confederation as "the
distinct and independent states" and noted that the Anti-Federalists, who
feared that the national government and the new Constitution posed a
distinct threat to the states, preferred a confederacy of sovereign
264. Lindahl, supra note 258, at 472-74.
265. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (holding that while the states
gave up a portion of their sovereignty in ratifying the Federal Constitution, they retained "a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty" protected by the Tenth Amendment).
266. Id.
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states.267
Others tried to disabuse the Framers of the broad notion of state
sovereignty. For example, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina
declared:
I apprehend the true intention of the States in uniting, is to have a
firm national Government, capable of effectually executing its acts,
and dispensing its benefits and protection. In it alone can be vested
those powers and prerogatives which more particularly distinguish a
sovereign State. . . . The idea which has been so long and falsely
entertained of each [State] being a sovereign State, must be given up;
for it is absurd to suppose there can be more than one sovereignty
within a Government.268
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, a member of Congress during the
Confederation period, "urged that we never were independent States,
were not such now, [and] never could be even on the principles of the
Confederation. 269 William Pierce of Georgia agreed and said, "distinc-
tions must be sacrificed . . . without, however, destroying them alto-
gether" and though he was "from a small state," he considered himself
"a citizen of the United States, whose general interest [he would] always
support. ' 270 Even after the Federalists succeeded in ratifying the Consti-
tution, and even after 1819 when Chief Justice Marshall narrowed state
sovereignty's scope in McCulloch v. Maryland,27 ' the notion of broad
state sovereignty persisted.
A concept of residual state sovereignty, supported by the Tenth
Amendment's explicit reservation of state power, prevailed as the rule
throughout much of the nineteenth century.272 The ordinary activities of
life for people across the nation were home-based, local, and closest to
the states. In the Republic's early days, the seat of federal power was
267. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 379 (James Madison) (Robert A. Rutland et al., eds., Univ. of
Chi, Press 1977). Madison wrote that "[e]ach state in ratifying the constitution, is considered as a
sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary act." Id. at
380; see also Brutus I (1787), reprinted in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE DEBATE
OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 4-13 (John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler eds.,
2d ed., Madison House 1998); Robert Yates & John Lansing, Reasons of Dissent, N.Y. J., Jan. 14,
1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 15-18 (Herbert J. Storing ed., Univ. of
Chicago Press 1981).
268. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
269. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 467 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
270. Id. at 474. There were also practical issues, according to Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts: could smaller states exist as independent sovereigns, or would they be oppressed
and absorbed by the more powerful states surrounding them? Id. at 462-63.
271. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
272. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by Darby v. United
States, 312 U.S. 657 (1941) (progressive federal antitrust and labor laws overturned because they
interfered with the powers of the states to protect their citizens' health, welfare, and morals);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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distant and remote from most citizens and leaders.273 From the time of
the Federal Convention 274 to the time of the Civil War, "the state gov-
ernments were primarily responsible for meeting the basic needs of
American citizens. The national government had little impact on the
daily lives of most Americans. Consequently, before the war, state citi-
zenship [and allegiance to the state] was paramount.
12 75
During the Civil War, the seceding southern states' assertions of
state sovereignty marked the high watermark for unbridled states' rights
advocates. In beginning the discussion on the Thirteenth Amendment in
1865, Representative Ashley expressed the counter position well when
he said, "[i]t is past comprehension how any man with the Constitution
before him, and the history of the convention . . . within his reach,
together with the repeated decisions of the Supreme Court against the
assumption of the State rights pretensions, can be found at this late day
defending the State sovereignty dogmas. 276 Congress's guarantee to
the states of a republican form of government, coupled with the supreme
power lodged in the national government, forcibly impressed upon them
"the utter indefensibility of the State sovereignty dogmas. 277 While
these dogmas persist today, they are mere vestiges of what they once
were; limited mainly to prohibiting the federal government from eviscer-
ating the power and capacity of the state governments to function as
state governments.278 Today, Justice Sutherland's statement in United
273. See generally RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (Univ. of Okla.
Press 1987); see also DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY,
AND STRUCTURE OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 341 (Anderson 1998). Ninety-five-percent of
the populace lived in rural areas at great distances from urban centers and the national capital, so
the town and county councils were supreme. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 67-94, 100, 300, 331 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., The Library of America 2004); THE
FIFTY STATES AND THEIR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 43, 45, 54-62 (James W. Fesler ed., Alfred A.
Knopf 1967).
274. In arguing against the likelihood that the proposed Constitution would endanger the
"several States[']" local authority, Madison pointed out that the People will look largely to the
states for their protection and governance, and that the state governments' powers under the
proposed Constitution, unlike the "few and defined" powers given to the federal government, are
"numerous and indefinite, . . . extend[ing] to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-
93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
275. Farber, supra note 198, at 427.
276. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 139 (1865).
277. Id.
278. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992). Justice Thomas, among others, persists in propounding a notion of broad retained
state sovereignty. For example, when concurring in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590
(1995), he stated, "[tihe Founding Fathers confirmed that most areas of life ... would remain
outside the reach of the Federal Government. Such affairs would continue to be under the
exclusive control of the States." The federal government would only possess the limited powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Id. at 584. Even assuming Justice Thomas is correct, his
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States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., addressing the United States' for-
eign relations power, epitomizes what should be recognized as the
United States' federal sovereignty, whether domestic or foreign in
scope. He stated that upon separation from Great Britain by her "colo-
nies, acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown ... to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as
the United States of America.... Rulers come and go; governments end
and forms of government change; but sovereignty survives. A political
society cannot endure without a supreme will somewhere.
2 79
National sovereignty, which Justice Sutherland described as "exter-
nal sovereignty," 280 has been recognized in international law for over
350 years. International law's concept of State sovereignty largely dates
to two philosophers - Thomas Hobbes, an Englishman in the seven-
teenth century, and Jean Bodin, a Frenchman in the sixteenth century -
and "the Peace of Westphalia," which ended the Thirty Years War
between a number of European powers.28' In the Peace of Westphalia
treaty, the European States agreed to limit their sovereignty, while at the
same time settling their boundaries and grievances, to clearly establish
their respective sphere's sovereignty.282 In his case for the "sovereign
state" in Leviathan, Hobbes claimed that all humankind required "a
common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the
common benefit. ' 28 3 Bodin viewed the sovereign as absolutely superior
within its territory, which included its unchallenged power to promul-
observations would not make states "sovereign." In Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000), the Court saw fit to limit the Commerce Clause's scope vis-A-vis retained state
sovereignty, particularly with respect to the regulation of non-economic/non-commercial
activities. In this context, the Court addressed the breadth of the residuum of state legislative
power, which some describe as an aspect of internal sovereignty, as opposed to state sovereignty
in the sense recognized by international law (i.e. capital "S" State sovereignty). See 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 15-18 (Herbert J. Storing ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1981).
279. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936) (emphasis
supplied). In Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland cited Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 705 (1893), in which Justice Gray relied on his opinion in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892), for the proposition that the power to exclude foreigners is "inherent in
sovereignty" and "essential to self-preservation." In Nishimura Ekiu, Justice Gray cited Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04 (1889), wherein Justice Field emphasized the
power to exclude aliens as an incident of sovereignty and as essential to preserving the State's
independence and the security of its citizens. While the Court linked sovereignty to the goal of
preserving national citizens' well-being in shameful racial contexts, this linkage nonetheless
reflects a critical connective dimension between sovereignty and national citizenship.
280. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 316.
281. See The Peace of Westphalia, Oct. 24, 1648, 1 Consolidated Treaty Series 198 (reprinted
in MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, CASES AND COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 24-28
(1st ed., West Publishing Co. 1997)).
282. See Janis, supra note 281, at 26-27.
283. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: PARTS I AND II 128 (Aloysius P. Martinich ed., Broadview
Editions 2005) (1651).
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gate laws, but "unified in one body or person, like the monarch in
France." '284 In time, absolute sovereignty would face limitations - such
as prohibitions on the use of force and the recognition of universal
human rights - under principles of international law, beginning with the
Westphalian treaties and continuing over the next several centuries in
the treaties, conventions, international institutions, customs, and interna-
tional legal principles that would follow.285
Today under international law, sovereignty remains the "corner-
stone" of "state independence and freedom of action," and the term is
often equated with state independence. 86 It is generally agreed that
"sovereignty is an attribute of statehood, and that only states can be sov-
ereign. '  In international law, sovereign States must possess the attrib-
utes of: "a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c)
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other
states." '88
The effective government of a sovereign State must be able to exer-
cise virtually complete control through its legal system - some would
say "complete autonomy"289 - to act as it will over its territory and peo-
ple. 290 Today, such internal control, external independence, and equality
among States is coupled with the recognition that significant interdepen-
dence with other international actors, as in the case of the European
Union Member States, may be consistent with State sovereignty. 29 I
Unlike the United States' constituent states, each European Union
Member State remains a sovereign in the international sense. It is not
unusual, however, to hear mention of European Community institutions
exercising international sovereignty within limits. 292 The Europeans
recognize internal and external sovereignty as well as the delegation of
delimited sovereign powers from Member States to the European Union,
284. See JEAN BODIN, THE Six BooKEs OF A COMMONWEALE (Kenneth Douglas McRae ed.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1962) (1576).
285. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 14-23 (rev. ed., Univ. of Pa. Press 1996); J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1, 44-55 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 6th ed.
1963).
286. Hannum, supra note 289, at 14-15.
287. Id. at 15.
288. Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097.
289. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 26 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1995).
290. See Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 44, 64 (1941). See also Hannum, supra note 289, at 14-15; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Clarendon Press 1979); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
177-85 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
291. See Chayes, supra note 289, at 26-28, 128, 273.
292. RALPH H. FoisoM, PRINCI LES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4-5 (Thomson West 2005).
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with the sovereign State's ultimate authority remaining with the Member
States. 93 This is not the American system, however, where the federal
government and the people remain sovereign.
The ECJ's use of the European Union's supremacy or primacy doc-
trine and coupled with the possible preemption of fundamental Member
State constitutional principles could constitute an encroachment on the
Member States' capacity to provide effective governments. Would such
preemption rob the Member States of the autonomy necessary to control
and protect their people and territory? Preempting Member State law
could even encroach on the Member States' external sovereignty. 94
Preempting Member State constitutional principles would represent an
even greater encroachment. The Member States could view such pre-
emption as a hostile intrusion into the Member States' non-delegated
capacity to control their territory, protect their citizens' rights and free-
doms, and preserve their political institutions. 295 The potential for the
"loss of sovereign power and autonomy effectuated by the extension of
European policies to almost all areas of public concern," through the
process of European integration, raises concerns in many parts of the
European Union, especially in Germany, the United Kingdom, France,
Denmark, and the Netherlands.
2 96
To retain effective State sovereignty, some would require that the
Member States be able to exercise complete autonomy to protect and
exert their will over their people, thus embracing the fundamental con-
stitutional character of the relationship between a government and its
people. The Member States' loss of autonomy under European Union
primacy and preemption doctrines in the domain of fundamental consti-
tutional rights, a unified foreign policy, along with absolute free move-
ment of persons, could blur the conceptual distinction between sovereign
States in a federal system and mere constituent political units existing
293. Anneli Albi & Peter Van Elsuwege, The EU Constitution, National Constitutions and
Sovereignty: An Assessment of a "European Constitutional Order," 29 EUR. L. REV. 741, 743-44
(2004). Much of the concern surrounding transfer of so-called sovereign powers has occurred
within the context of applying the European Union's supremacy, or primacy, doctrine. This
doctrine applies when Member State laws, including fundamental constitutional principles,
conflict with or stand as an obstacle to the achievement of the European Union's objectives as
articulated in the EC Treaty or other European Union law. In the event of a conflict between
them, or when state laws or conduct stand as an obstacle to the achievement of EU Treaty
objectives, European Union law or Treaty provisions are deemed to preempt Member State laws
or even Member State constitutional principles. See also Francis J. Conte, Reinforcing
Democracy, Sovereignty and Union Efficacy: Supremacy and Subsidiarity in the European Union,
26 DUBLIN U. L.J. 1 (2004).
294. See Brunner v. The European Union Treaty, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 77.
295. See generally, id.; see also Ingolf Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European
Union, 27 EUR. L. REV. 511, 513 (2002).
296. Pernice, supra note 295, at 511, 513.
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within a federal European nation. The Member States' obligation to
facilitate the enforcement of superseding European Union law adds fur-
ther confusion.297
These observations may be unwarranted for the moment, as most
would likely agree that the Member States have not relinquished their
sovereignty in the external, international sense. The Member States
have independently agreed through their own democratic institutions,
however, to confer on the European Union a substantial number of
delimited competences. This conferral leaves the great reservoir of
power in the Member States' hands, unlike in the United States where
federal powers are derived from the people. Because the Member States
have themselves granted the European Union competence to act in lim-
ited areas for the well-being of their citizens, individual State autonomy
and sovereignty still exist. Furthermore, the EC Treaty designates Mem-
ber States as key actors in the European Union's legislative process. By
acting through their government representatives, Member States have
not relinquished all legislative control, even in the fair number of areas
of European Union competence.298
The European Union's very nature - its establishment by treaties
among sovereign nations - allows Member States to withdraw with vir-
tual impunity at any time, thereby abandoning their limited subservi-
ence. This ability is qualified with the adjective "virtual" because the
297. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 10, Oct. 11, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
183. Article 10 states that "Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from
action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the
community's tasks."
In the United States, it is clear that state institutions are obliged to obey federal law,
sometimes even in terms of state governmental actors' activities. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S.
141 (2000). In Reno, the Court held that a federal law prohibiting persons and entities, including
state governments, from divulging personal identification information applied to personal
identification information obtained from motor vehicle records. The Court concluded that the
federal law was a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power. The federal law neither
interfered with the states' reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment nor did it violate
principles of federalism.
Presumably, the non-sovereign European Union institutions could do as much, perhaps under
Article 10. On the other hand, under the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism, the
American Congress can neither compel a state legislature to enact a particular law nor enlist state
executive officials to carry out federal regulatory programs. See, e.g., New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). Wouldn't it
likewise be a violation of the Member States' "sovereign state" status if European Union
institutions commandeered the Member States' legislative and executive organs? The ECJ could
not enforce such a measure under the auspices of the supremacy doctrine and Article 10, could it?
298. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 5. Article 5 states that the "Community shall act within the
limits of the powers conferred upon it by the Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein."
The Treaty is an agreement entered into by each Member State, which, in effect, confers certain
powers upon the European Union.
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EC Treaty does not contain a withdrawal provision; the proposed Con-
stitutional Treaty, however, did include a withdrawal provision.299 Ordi-
narily, under international law as expressed in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, termination of treaties or withdrawal of parties is
done in accordance with the terms of the negotiated treaty.3 °0 Without a
party's material breach of the treaty's essential conditions30 or a funda-
mental change of circumstances, 30 2 withdrawal would ordinarily require
the other parties consent 30 3 or would have to be deemed "implied by the
nature of the treaty." 3' The EC Treaty's nature30 5 may be such that
anything less than an implicit right of withdrawal would be tantamount
to eviscerating a non-consenting Member State's sovereignty. While
there may be some difficulty in articulating a clear right to withdraw
under the EC Treaty, "as a matter of practice treaties are regularly
denounced by states unilaterally. 30 6
The ultimate surrender of State sovereignty in a system like the
European Union can probably only ultimately occur when the Member
States' foreign affairs officers join to make European policy as a group
binding upon dissenting states. Essentially, this would result in a de
facto ceding of foreign policy-making to the European Union, in effect
subordinating the Member States to the collective, corporate whole.30 7
In implementing the European Council's general guidelines, the
Council of Ministers 308 is expected to take joint action binding on non-
abstaining Member States30 9 and to develop and adopt common posi-
299. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-60, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 40. The as yet
unratified treaty provides a process by which "[a]ny Member State may decide to withdraw from
the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements."
300. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 54, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
(effective Jan. 27, 1980).
301. Id. art. 60.
302. Id. art. 62.
303. Id. art. 57.
304. Id. art. 56; see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 36-39
(4th ed., Aspen Pub. 2003).
305. The EC Treaty is characterized by economic integration, incipient political integration,
delegation of certain state powers to the European Union, a robust supremacy doctrine, and broad
free movement principles. The EC Treaty comes strikingly close to altering the nature of a
Member State's political community. See Conte, supra note 293.
306. Janis, supra note 281, at 37 (citing ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY
TERMINATION, at ix (Yale Univ. Press 1975)).
307. Pernice, supra note 295, at 522-23.
308. The Council of Ministers is a working institution which possesses a primary and extensive
legislative role as well as an executive function. It is made up of ministers from the participating
Member States' governments.
309. When a Member State abstains from voting on a common foreign or security policy
decision, it may qualify its abstention with a formal declaration. The Member State is not bound
to apply the decision, though it must accept the European Union's commitment to the decision.
See TEU, supra note 43, art. 23.1.
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tions on foreign and security policy. As a practical matter, however,
unanimity is required; a single Member State can oppose a decision, all
but precluding its adoption unless the European Council reaches una-
nimity.3 10 In the Treaty on European Union, which both established a
Union Minister of Foreign Affairs and facilitated a common foreign and
security policy, the Member States' external sovereignty was preserved
- collective policy "shall not prejudice the specific character of the
security and defense policy of certain Member States."31' When one
considers the disparities between Member State views on foreign policy
issues - for example, on the Iraq War - carrying out a common Euro-
pean Union foreign policy is unlikely for the time being.
31 2
Though seen as more centralizing and "Europeanizing," the pro-
posed Constitutional Treaty actually called for greater involvement from
Member State parliaments and a heightened role for subsidiary princi-
ples 3 13 in the legislative process, along with a higher profile for the
European Union executive (including a Foreign Minister). In effect, the
Constitutional Treaty was checking the EU's centralizing tendencies
with institutional protections for Member State competences, and, thus,
was also protecting their sovereignty. But, the Member States did not
ratify the European Constitution. This was quite possibly a rejection of
ceding further aspects of State sovereignty to the European Union with-
out sufficient understanding of the Member State competences protec-
tions. In October 2000, a similar sense of popular notions may have
compelled British Prime Minister Tony Blair to say: "Europe can, in its
economic and political strength, be a superpower, not a superstate. ' 31 4
On the other hand, more extensive European Union competences
and an even more Europeanized power to execute European Union for-
eign policy 31 5 may reemerge under a new constitutional treaty or subse-
310. Id. art. 23.2.
311. Id. art. 17.
312. The French and German governments' contra-American Iraq policies contrasted with the
British, Italian, and Polish governments' pro-American Iraq policies (in this regard "contra-
American" and "pro-American" should be read as contra- or pro-Bush Administration).
313. See Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-3, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 11-12.
314. Blair Attacks Two-Tier Europe, BBC NEWS, Oct. 6, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/europe/959202.stm (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
315. In the midst of the Orange Revolution, culminating in the reversal of an electoral result
favoring the Yushchenko government, Secretary-General Javier Solana took rather strong
European Union foreign policy positions in support of Yushchenko. This occurred without much
consultation or involvement of the Dutch Presidency or of the major European Union powers.
This suggests very affirmatively a collective Europeanist viewpoint. It is doubtful, though, that
European Union foreign policy will develop in the future in many areas using this somewhat
precipitous approach. See Grzegorz Gromadzki, Oleksandr Sushko, Marius Vahl, Kataryna
Wolczuk & Roman Walczuk, Will the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit? EU - Ukraine Relations in
2005 and the Beginning of 2006, (Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw 2005), available at http://
www.batory.org.pl/doc/orange.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2006).
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quent agreements. For now, however, the European Union's power
primarily relates to limited aspects of so-called internal sovereignty.
The European Union's institutions, including the ECJ, are applying law
in the realm of competences delegated to the European Union. Under-
scoring this perspective, Article I-5.1316 of the proposed Constitutional
Treaty asserted: "The Union shall respect the equality of each Member
State before the Constitution as well as their national identities, inherent
in their fundamental structures.... It shall respect their essential State
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, main-
taining law and order and safeguarding national security. 3 17
European Union Member State citizenship, like U.S. citizenship, is
based on State sovereignty, while European Union citizenship is treaty-
based.3 8 Article 17 of the EC Treaty, establishing Union citizenship for
Member States citizens, states that "[c]itizenship of the Union shall
complement and not replace national citizenship. 319 In the United
States, citizenship is granted to all people born or naturalized in the
United States as well as those born to United States citizens outside of
the country;320 by virtue of their American citizenship, these people are
also citizens of the state in which they reside.321  The European Union's
situation is the reverse, a person is a European Union citizen by virtue of
his or her Member State citizenship.
In the United States, it is federal citizenship that counts most fully
in the context of sovereignty-based rights. Unfortunately, a case demon-
strating American xenophobia, Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, may
best illustrate this point. In Nishimura Ekiu, the Court stated, "[i]t is an
accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the
power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them
316. Though unratified, each Member State's head of state has agreed to this article.
317. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. 1-5, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 12 (emphasis
supplied).
318. The People, who form the sovereign State's heart, lungs, blood, and mind, are its citizens.
In republican democracies, the citizens, the people, and the sovereign State are one. In fact, it has
been observed that in the United States' constitutional system, it is the People, and not the
embodiment of the state, who are sovereign. Justice Field in his Fong Yue Ting dissent, went so
far as to say that "[s]overeignty ... is in this country vested in the people, and only in the people."
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 758 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
In the context of popular sovereignty, the citizens and the State are one (or at the very least
bound to each other), owing each other allegiance and support. The sovereign owes its citizens
freedom, equality, rights, rules, social benefits, good order, protection, beneficial relations with
other States, and security. The citizens, in turn, are obliged to provide the sovereign their
allegiance, service, and participation in the State's political, social, and economic life. The right
of virtually absolute free movement within a sovereign State would be one of these rights.
319. EC Treaty, supra note 27, art. 17.
320. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
321. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
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only in such cases upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. 32 2
The case remains a dramatic example of the sovereign's power to this
day.
In the United States, individual states cannot wholly exclude citi-
zens from other states, but the United States as the sovereign may
wholly exclude those who do not hold American citizenship. An Ameri-
can citizen cannot be expelled and is guaranteed full protection from the
sovereign. It is also largely by virtue of one's status as a American
citizen that the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause provides protection of the right to reside in another state as well
as the right to obtain that state's benefits.32 3
This is not to say that non-nationals are deprived of constitutional
protection in the United States. For example, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause has been interpreted to mean that a state
may not discriminate against a lawful resident alien on the basis of his or
her non-citizenship in relation to trade, profession, or employment,
unless the position involves a governmental function or lies "at the heart
of our political institutions. 32 4 Yet, despite the broad constitutional
protections afforded to non-citizens, the United States Supreme Court
continues to underscore the differences between aliens and citizens.
This is evidenced by the power to exclude non-citizens from a range of
political activities: participating in the states' and the nation's demo-
cratic political institutions, voting, holding office, and engaging in pub-
lic work that entails broad policy-related functions. The rationale for
these exclusions is the sovereign's need to preserve its political
community.325
Some scholars disagree with the notion that national citizens should
be accorded greater protections and privileges than non-citizen residents;
instead they argue that permanent resident aliens should be afforded all
the rights of mobility, residency, work, and benefits afforded American
citizens.3 26 Under this view, there is neither sufficient reason to pre-
serve this sort of discrete American community nor to discriminate
against non-citizens. However, the consensus is that an American politi-
322. 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
323. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501-03 (1999).
324. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S 291, 295-97 (1978); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979) (upholding under the public function exception a New York law that precluded non-
citizens who did not intend to apply for U.S. citizenship from employment as public school
teachers); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down, as a denial of equal
protection, a state law that denied non-citizen permanent residents the ability to receive welfare
benefits).
325. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647-48 (1973).
326. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7
CoN sT. COMMENT. 9 (1990).
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cal community exists. Furthermore, most agree that aggregate member-
ship in a political community shapes that community; 327 citizenship in a
sovereign state is a vital matter of self-definition and self-government.
Justice Byron White expressed a similar sentiment in Cabell v. Chavez-
Salido:
The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a
deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary consequence of
the community's process of political self-definition. Self-govern-
ment, whether direct or through representatives, begins by defining
the scope of the community of the governed and thus of the govern-
ment as well: Aliens are by definition those outside of this
community. 8
By virtue of treaty-based and constitutional principles, the European
Union and the United States offer different notions of citizenship. Both
largely protect residency rights and free movement principles. How-
ever, and probably as it should be, persons claiming rights under non-
national citizenship face greater limitations and are not as fully protected
as they would be under a sovereignty-based citizenship because the body
granting their rights is not the sovereign. The sovereign retains its self-
defining political community and the concomitant power to protect that
community and its resources, security, and national consciousness.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In cases like Baumbast, the ECJ advanced European notions of free
movement and furthered the European Union's goal of economic inte-
gration, but also appeared to move beyond mere economic integration,
the animating purpose of the Union's free movement principles. Some-
what similarly, in Saenz v. Roe the United States Supreme Court
advanced the "one nation, one people" principle under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the context of eco-
nomic integration, each court has addressed the right to practice a trade,
profession, or livelihood or to obtain social benefits as a new resident;
furthermore, each has applied similar analytical frameworks to deter-
mine whether a state or Member State's free movement restrictions are
justifiable.
For example, the ECJ required that, to be valid, the state restriction
must both relate to a serious threat to security, health, or other public
327. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 32
(Basic Books 1983).
328. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982) (holding that a state could require
that deputy probation officers be American citizens because the position involves policy
execution, which substantially affects members of the political community).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
interest and be necessary to achieve that important interest. 329 Other-
wise stated, the state restriction imposing an obstacle to free movement
must not be disproportionate to the aim pursued.33° This close scrutiny
is warranted because Member States have conferred some power on the
European Union concerning free movement of workers as well as inter-
nal market powers. These principles are among the European Union's
driving forces, and countervailing issues of national sovereignty and citi-
zenship are not as important in this "internal market" context. To fur-
ther the economic integration animating purpose of freedom of
movement in the European Union, the ECJ should closely scrutinize free
movement restrictions. In the United States, the Supreme Court often
asks whether non-state citizens are a peculiar source of evil at which a
restrictive statute is aimed 331 and whether the discrimination against the
non-citizens is closely related to the statute's legitimate aim.332 When in
the U.S., however, the rights to travel and residency implicate national
citizenship more fully, the "one nation, one people" animating purpose
compels a higher degree of scrutiny.
Free movement under European Union citizenship, however, is dif-
ferent. As Hannah Arendt puts it, "freedom ... as a tangible reality...
is spatially limited. 333 Despite globalization and the ensuing need for
adjustments to our understanding of the sovereign State, freedom,
though flawed in the case of some minorities in some states, still flour-
ishes within functioning nation-state borders. Freedom occurs as a
result of national security and self-identification within a political com-
munity that promotes freedom. Maintaining sovereignty's essentials,
especially among States that have delegated some of their powers to
international entities like the European Union, is critical to maintaining
freedom.
In the European Union, these critical aspects of sovereignty and
national citizenship are most clearly implicated when free movement
and residency principles are applied as rights under European Union citi-
zenship provisions.
Recent American jurisprudence, Saenz v. Roe, for example, is
encouraging because it establishes that American citizens have an abso-
lute right to reside - to be free as well as secure - wherever they choose
within the United States' territorial boundaries. This freedom is only
subject to a genuineness inquiry regarding state residency. Saenz v. Roe
329. See, e.g., Case 36/75, Rutili v. Ministre de l'Interieur, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 27-28, 32.
330. See Case C-379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ., 1989 E.C.R. 3967, 11; see also Case
118/75, Watson & Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, 21.
331. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948).
332. Id. at 396.
333. HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 279 (Viking Press 1965).
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reinforced the "one nation, one people" notion by recognizing and rein-
forcing free movement principles under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, the Court demanded strict scrutiny concerning state limita-
tions on free movement and freedom to reside. This jurisprudence
clearly reflects the notion that national citizens should be free to thrive
within their nationwide community in terms of security, social and
health protection, and societal identification. To further enhance the
United States' sovereignty-based citizenship, the Supreme Court could
require even greater scrutiny of supposed state justification - for exam-
ple, over technical residency definitions that place undue restrictions on
individuals who are both recognized American citizens and state
residents.
In Europe, however, Italians will be Italians,334 as Danes will be
Danes, Irish will be Irish, Dutch will be Dutch, French will be French,
Poles will be Poles, and when they come, Croatians will be Croatians.
The European Union and the ECJ have proclaimed and trumpeted Euro-
pean citizenship as if it ushered in the European state. 335 However,
because "political unity" and national identity are not animating pur-
poses of the freedom of movement in the European Union, European
citizenship stands for, or should stand for, nothing more than the incre-
mental extension of free movement rights to non-workers whose move-
ment and residency is not overly burdensome to the economic well-
being and security and national identity of the Member States.
The ECJ has supported expanding free movement beyond a mere
economic linkage and has encouraged a notion of European "conscious-
ness." 336 The ECJ's silence regarding the Member States' continued
role and significance as sovereigns is, however, disconcerting. This elo-
quence on the one hand and silence on the other undermines the delicate
balance between national sovereignty and European integration.
Rather than impose a heavy burden on Member States to justify,
under the European Union's citizenship provisions, any limitation on the
freedom of non-nationals to reside and obtain residency benefits equal to
nationals, the ECJ should acknowledge that vital national sovereignty
concerns are implicated. Instead of compelling the Member State to
334. In fall 2004, during a conversation between the author and an Italian political science
graduate student regarding European Union doctrines, the student insisted that Italy was Italy, and
Italians were Italians, not "Europeans." It was Italian laws and rights that counted, despite both
the European Union's supremacy doctrine and European citizenship. Rarely outside the European
Union institutions does one hear nationals self-identifying as "Europeans" rather than Frenchmen,
Germans, and Spaniards, for example. Interview with Italian political science graduate student at
the University of Dayton in Dayton, Ohio (Oct. 29, 2004).
335. See generally Case C-413/99, Baumbast v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, 2002
E.C.R. 1-7091.
336. Id.
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demonstrate that the limitation or condition is both supported by Euro-
pean Union legislation and necessary to the Member State's objective,
the court should be more deferential to exercises of retained Member
State sovereignty. The host Member State might even be more welcom-
ing than required. In fact, a number of Member States have been more
receptive to immigrants from the new Eastern European Member States
than the enlargement transition rules require.337 Yet, this receptiveness
ought to be the Member State's prerogative, made while considering its
citizens' needs and interests.
Instead, in situations implicating free movement principles based
on European Union citizenship, rather than economically-linked free
movement, the ECJ could begin with the presumption that a Member
State's limitation upon or condition for the non-economically linked
freedom to reside is valid. To overcome this presumption of validity,
the petitioner would have to demonstrate that the limitation is unrelated
or not rationally related to a legitimate objective.338
By increasing deference to the Member States' retained sover-
eignty, this alternative approach to free movement would in effect rec-
ognize that Union citizenship, although beneficial, is inferior to and does
not replace national citizenship. This approach would also acknowledge
and alleviate the fear that national identity, economic stability, and
security are being sacrificed - a fear that may have contributed to the
Members States' failure to ratify the recently proposed European Union
Constitution. American and European approaches to free movement
should recognize the inherent differences between national citizenship
and the freedom of movement it animates, the distinctions between non-
sovereignty based citizenship and economically-linked free movement,
and the freedom of movement principles that best serve these concepts.
337. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, supra note 13, at 4. Under the
Transitional Arrangements for enlargement, the fifteen older Member States are permitted to
maintain entry and residency restrictions regarding workers from eight of the ten newest Member
States. These restrictions are permitted during a transitional period that will terminate in 2011.
Even though they could be more restrictive, Ireland, Sweden, and the U.K. will not apply
restrictions on access to their labor markets. These Member States have emphasized "the positive
contribution made by workers from the EU 8 to their national economies." Id. at 5.
338. For example, protecting public health, the environment, national security, safety,
economic stability, and national and cultural identity are all potential legitimate objectives.
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